Statements Concerning Akita

Statement of Genzaburo OKI (9 November - 13 November 1947): AKITA came to Tokyo, assured that they were making preparations for OKI’s arrival in Fukuoka.

On 16 January OKI prepared a report for the Minister of the 1st Demob, from Chief of Demob. Bureau, which INADA, AKITA, NISHIHARA saw, which stated that the report that about 31 flyers were not killed at WAH, but were placed on a suicide plane disguised as a plane from Gen. Staff Hq. was false.

OKI identifies a 16 January 1946 document (not hereto attached) as a copy of the Demob. Minister's report, containing the seals of OKI, AKITA, INADA and NISHIHARA; it was sent out “by NISHIHARA's order. Both INADA and AKITA read the report.

In mid February 1946 OKI reported the matter of the execution of the 4 flyers the second time, stated the matter as ITO told him, with the approval of AKITA, INADA and NISHIHARA.

AKITA: Chief of General Affairs Section.

Statement of Jukiro NAKAO ( 10 Sept. 1947): Probably the original of the general order stating that it was not necessary to send any more B-29 crew members, excepting the pilot, to Tokyo, that fighter pilots and flyers of intelligence value were still to be sent and the rest be disposed of as seemed proper at the local headquarters, received by the Intelligence Section would have been seen by SUGINO and kept inthe Intelligence Section after being shown to the Senior Staff Officer (AKITA).

Statement of Kenichi YAMAMOTO (3 October 1946): In May 1946 SATO told YAMAMOTO of 3 executions at WAH, the first involving 8 Prisoners about 19 June; the second about 11 August involving 8; and the third about 15 August at Aburayama involving 15. YAMAMOTO believes SATO was investigating crash survivors. About 16-17 May 1946 YAMAMOTO heard from HARASAKI that FUKUSHIMA, AKITA and SATO were conferring regarding a report they were going to submit to SCAP. The first report they submitted did not mention the executions.

Statement of Kiyoharu TOMOMORI (20 January 1947 - 20 March 1947): All persons involved in the WA atrocities were called to dinner at Futsukaichi 31 January by NISHIHARA, which, dinner included NISHIHARA, YOKOYAMA, INADA, FUKUSHIMA, ITO, AKITA and OKI. After dinner TOMOMORI told NISHIHARA about the false report sent to the Min. of War by Western Demob. On 5 or 7 February AKITA told TOMOMORI that the correction had been made.

Report of OKI (ATIS Translation): About 11 December AKITA met OKI in Tokyo. On 3 January about 2100 OKI called on INADA and talked to him and AKITA, at which INADA said that AKITA and he had no connection with the executions, that he investigated the incidents as chairman of the PW Investigation Committee and knew of them. Statement of Col AKITA (about 8 Jan. 1946): In May 1945 SATO told AKITA he would like to dispose of the flight personnel in a manner similar to the Doolittle incident, asked AKITA to get the approval of YOKOYAMA, who agreed with OKI that examination by a military tribunal is supposed to be had, which he relayed to SATO. AKITA had never heard of execution of flyers without trial; approval for such had never been granted by YOKOYAMA. AKITA was in So. Kyushu from mid-June to 23 June 1945; knew nothing of the 20 June executions.

INADA stated the arrangements had been made with 2A to fabricate a report which would state that the flyers had been sent to Hiroshima about July, killed in early August by the atom bomb, that they had already shown an American Officer the spot, that if disclosed it would implicate the Medical Department and 2nd Army, that it would be a disgrace to the Army, and therefore OKI should not refer to it in his report. AKITA agreed with INADA that every attempt should be made to conceal.

INADA then said in the 16A operational summary that all US soldiers were to be killed if the US Army came to Kyushu, but that this did not necessarily mean the flyers, that YOKOYAMA has a habit of saying "Yes, yes" flippantly to indicate acknowledgement of problems he doesn’t understand thoroughly, which might have happened if ITO was correct as to the 20 June meeting; that the problem would be solved if SATO admitted responsibility. INADA and AKITA then agreed 'that they hadn’t heard of executions before the surrender, and INDA stated that he and YOKOYAMA were prepared to take responsibility as CC and C/S, for men under their command, but not directly connected.

SATO stated that a short time before the 19 June airraid, Wamitsu (WAKO) came to him and suggested the flyers be executed without trial, since trial would be difficult. SATO agreed, and YOKOYAMA consented. On 20 June ITO expressed a desire to execute them when he came to the Air Def. Opr. Room. Wamitsu (WAKO) followed and expressed the same opinion, and SATO told him to prepare. SATO then states that the information that permission was obtained from YOKOYAMA through AKITA on the 20th was a mistake, that after the surrender YOKOHAMA told him that it would reflect on the prestige of the Army if it was said that the CG gave permission and not to tell anyone that permission was given.

INADA went to Tokyo 17 January, returned 29 January. At, the Inspectorate of Demob. IHADA told Defendant that as a result of talks at the Tokyo Demob. Min. it was said that the Minister would order the Higher Court to investigate the matter, that he brought back the copy of the report to be submitted to G-HQ, of the OF, which he gave to AKITA.

In the first of February AKITA said to Defendant that the document he had was a copy of the Demob. Min., PW Inves. Sec., report for submittance to the OF, that on its being submitted, Tokyo will apprise Fukuoka by telegram, whereupon NISHIHARA and INADA would submit a report in person to the Fukuoka CIC.

Assumes AKITA wrote preface of report to CIC, from penciled characters.

ITEZONO's section was not changed, since he took charge at the killing. INADA agreed, instructed Defendant to add explanatory notes to all corrections. IHADA approved the final draft, a copy was given to AKITA to show to NISHIHARA, who returned it on NISHIHARA seeing it.

About 5 March there was a dinner of NISHIHARA, OKI, INADA, AKITA, ITO, SUZUKI at Futukaichi, and with INADA and AKITA in INADA's quarters, QKI said he did not know the particulars of the KIU case, but thought with the SUZUKI investigation it would be disclosed. INADA said he wanted no voluntary exposition of KIU, although nothing could be done if the facts were disclosed, to which AKITA agreed.

INADA then suggested that the OF might arrest them suddenly, so told OKI to dispose of the documents he accumulated and write revised summaries of the statements of each individual to be submitted when requested by the Occupation Forces, to show them to AKITA.

OKI then "burned part of his notes, made revisions, and wrote the summaries. Instructions given by INADA and AKITA were to not (l) enter ITO’s name; (2) name the executioners; (3) mention karate and archery incidents; (4) enter names having no connection; (5) enter KIU incident or the connection of 3A; (6) mention the latter which SATO said was sent by a high ranking 0 to MP Hq. Defendant complied.

About the end of March OKI moved to quarters with NISHIHARA, who told him he didn't know the particulars of the investigation; didn’t care to know, and thought it was unnecessary for OKI to have the documents relating thereto in his possession, and OKI burned them, except one copy each of 1st and 2nd reports and summaries of SATO, FUKUSHIMA, -ITEZONO and others, with the revisions suggested by INADA. OKI reported this to NISHIHARA, INADA and AKITA.

In late March AKITA asked OKI to list the executioners, he saying that the young Officers wanted to take all responsibility including that for the NCO’s, and therefore the names of the NCOs should be withheld. OKI named the executioners for AKITA.

Statement of Yoshinao SATO (ATIS Translation): Up to March of last year (1946?) AKITA (a senior staff Officer who supervised SATO and others) calimed that permission for execution without trial was granted in early May, now repudiates this, claims he stated to execute them after courts martial, although the OKI investigation revealed that courts martial were considered unnecessary.

Statement of Hiro.ji NAKAYAMA (16 Jan 1948): NAKAYAMA was redrafted as a 1st Lt. in the WAH Propoganda Section under Col. MACHIDA, said job included giving information to civilians and relaying airraid warnings, censoring, although did no censorship, did have contact with SATO, YAKUMARU, AKITA, TOMOMORI, FUKUSHIMA and INADA.

Report from Central Liaison to SCAP as to Officers who served in Seibu A Dist (12 Jan 1948): AKITA, Hiroshi, Col: Staff ofSeibu Army, 16th Army, and Sasebo Naval Sta.- 15 August to 15 October 1945; Staff Seibu Army - 15 October to 30 November 1945; Chief of General Affairs Section of General Affairs Department - 1 December 1945 to 15 June 1946, of Seibu Demob.

Statement of ITEZONO (25 Oct. 1946. ATIS 35589): Addition to version of mid-August execution at Aburayama: In late March 1946, ITEZONO was called to headquarters, met AKITA, Sr. Staff Officer, who asked what the JA had questioned him about. ITEZONO told him that he asked him if he had slashed any flyers at Aburayama. AKITA then asked why he asked that since the slashers had been identified, produced a paper with a list of executioners, asked ITEZONO if it were correct, which he confirmed.

AKITA then said that according to SATO the raiding force Officers came to him on the morning Of the execution for permission to execute 8 Am. airmen, and after receiving it .took the airmen to Aburayama, but that he didn’t think any such foolishment happened because TOMOMORI was also there, but that, in any event, SATO was still talking nonsense, that when he summoned him he would say that he understood, but outside he tried to evade responsibility by toiling outrageous stories, that such Conduct inexcusible in a staff Officer.

Statement of Masaharu KIKKAWA (YOSHIKAWA) (30 Feb. 1948): About January 1946 KIKKAWA went to Fukuoka to get information as to the American investigation, after discussing it with TAN I and KITANO. KIKKAWA asked for SATO, who was out, then asked for AKITA, told him of his purpose, and AKITA said he knew of the 9, but told KIKKAWA to be preps,red for possible exposure, said INADA was handling the entire matter of those kklled at WAH and that KIKKAWA should see him for details.

Statement of Fumio TSUBOSHIMA (4 Mar 1948): The matter of the 3 executions was taken to the Central Committee, where it was decided to send OKI to WAH to investigate, since Gen ITO seemed implicated, and TSUBOSHIMA sent TAKAHASHI therein early January 1946 to discover the true facts, who returned about 12 January, and said that the versions were conflicting, having talked to NISHIHARA, INADA, AKITA, YAKAMARU and OKI, said that SATO and FUKUSHIMA had told him that 15 flyers were executed in mid-June 1945, 8 in August before the 15th and 15 on 15 August.

Statement of Masaharu KIKKAWA (17 Feb 48): On orders of the CG KIKKAWA went to WAH about 10 Jan 46, asked for SATO, who was not present, met AKITA, told him there was no suspicion at Hiroshima. AKITA told him to see INADA who was handling the American Investigation, which he did.