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Statement Concerning Suzuki

Statement Title Statement of Ito
Record Type Statement
Subject of Statement Shigiyoshi Suzuki
Statement Provided By

Suzuki, a Lt. General, Legal Officer, sent by the Demobilization Ministry to the Western Demobilization Office to investigate. He contacted Ito as to the 20 June 1945 execution.

Statement Title Statement of Murata
Record Type Statement
Subject of Statement Shigiyoshi Suzuki
Statement Provided By Sadayohi Murata

In May 1946, Suzuki, the Prosecutor, wired Murata to come to Fukuoka and questioned him for one half hour on the 20 June execution. Later took statement. (Japanese report to Kijiro SHIDEHARA, 1st Demobilization Ministry by Kijiro Suzuki, public procurator, 1st Demobilization Supreme Court Document, Document #27468, 31 March 1946.


Yokoyama was the Commanding General of Western Army Area from December 1944. In April or May 1945, he drew the manual for the coming Kyushu invasion which consisted of a last ditch stand, including the civilian participation to annihilate the United States. There were prior instructions from the Central Department that such was not meant to apply to captured airmen who were to be tried by a military tribunal.


Sato asked the Commanding General for instructions as to the flyers and the Commanding General told him to treat them according to the Central Dept. directive (this is a bit ambiguous). It appears that Sato misunderstood him, that this meant the penalty placed on flyers without trial, and ordered disposition in three instances.


1. Fukuoka underwent extensive pombing on 19 June. Capt. Yusei WAMITSU (same characters can be translated either WAKO or WAMITSU and in this instance the report is discussing WAKO, although it refers in each instance to him as WAMITSU) came to see Sato about the advisibility of administering punishment to the flyers and he requested instructions. Sato accepted Wako's opinion and ordered disposition and WAKO and several others disposed of the eight others. (Sato is the authority for the WAKO story).


2. In the latter part of July Sato was ordered to Tokyo. On his return about 10 August, Sato went to the Army Commander to report, who demanded the immediate disposition of the 8 flyers interned while Sato was away. Sato understood such disposal was without trial, etc. and on 11 August ordered Major Itezona attached to the Operations
Dept. to dispose of the eight. On 12 August Itezona had his subordinate officers dispose of the flyers near Aburayama Crematorium.


3. On 15 August Major Kusumoto, Ryonosuke, Adjutant Western Army, was informed by the Senior Adjutant, Western Army, that he would like an opinion from higher Hqs. as to whether flyers would be removed to CP when combined with CP at war's end. Kusumoto went to Sato who said "severe disposition". Sato then went to Major Genereal Fukushima, Kysuaku, and told him his desire. Fukushima told Suzuki that he told Sato that this was out of the question since the Potsdam Declaration was already accepted, that there were other methods and ordered Sato to make a study of them. Sato, however, states that he received a consent of "all right".

Sato ordered Kusumoto to take severe measures - who transmitted orders to officers in the Operations Office - who disposed of the 15 at the Aburayama location. Major General Akinobu Ito, Army Judicial Dept. Western Army, arrived at his post 20 June just before the atrocity mentioned in "1" was completed, but he had no prior connection. (Note inaccuracy here).

About the middle of May, in response to Sato's query as to whether it was okay to dispose of airmen without trial, Ito said it was impossible and placed four flyers under military tribunal.

Colonel Tomomori, Asst. C/S of Western Army, received on 11 August, an invitation to watch the execution and he went to the execution as mentioned in "2" and did watch.


Suzuki recommended preliminary hearing on Sato and Wako, but not the others.

 

 

Statement Title Second Document by Suzuki
Record Type Statement
Subject of Statement Shigiyoshi Suzuki
Statement Provided By Shigiyoshi Suzuki

Sato ordered the beheading, but under misapprehension.


1. A young officer who had no connection with the execution, fearing the fire of the 19 June bombing might spread to the detention barracks, proposed the prisoners be subjected to severe measures, but withdrew it when disapproved by Inada who was near by. The next day Wako sent a representative of public opinion to Sato stating that capital punishment would be the result of a trial. Wako suggested disposing of the prisoners as if killed in the bombing the previous day. Sato accepted, based on a misapprehension ordered Wako to carry it out as a result of which 8 or 9 were beheaded.

2. Commanding General's instructions: To refer proper prisoners to Military Tribunal, others to PW camp. This was given to Sato about 10 August. On 11 August Sato ordered Itezona to "deal severely", and obtained Fukushima's sanction as an extra precaution. However, Itezona went to Tomomori and invited him to attend proceedings. On 12 August Itezona had his subordinate officers behead the men at Aburayama.

3. On 15 August, Kuzumoto received from his Adjutant an inquiry as to whether the prisoners were to be taken with the Hqs to the Command Post. Kusumoto went to Sato who said "let's do it" (??) but Sato went to Fukushima and told him he wanted to subject the prisoners to severe punishment. Fukushima claims that he said it was out of the question with the war ended, that there were other methods besides killing and ordered him to make a study of them. Sato claims Fukushima said "all right". However, Kuzumoto, on order of Sato, using mostly officers of Operations Office beheaded 15 flyers that day. Said 15 flyers having been interned by Western Army.

According to the report of Western Army Demobilization Inspectorate, on the 15th, Fukushima did not distinctly tell Sato that he disapproved and Sato was convinced that there would be no valid objection, based on general instructions from the Commanding General, so said "let's do it" to Kusumoto. There were no witnesses as to Sato's and Fukushima's conversation. Sato insists that he did not misunderstand the Commanding General. Tomomori was merely a spectator.