Statements Concerning Yoshinao Sato

SATO, YOSHINAO

Statement of Sato (2 July 194-6)

After visiting KIU Hospital to observe the experiments, Sato did not see Ishiyama until October when he visited him as to keeping the operations se­cret. Ishiyama said he could not hide this matter by himself, requested Sato to have the army conceal it; Sato said he would do his best.

Sato again saw Ishiyama in November or December, told him that they would try to conceal the matter of the experiments by stating that the PWs were sent to Hiroshima and killed by the atomic bombs. Ishiyama was very worried that the experiments would be disclosed.

In January Sato discussed the matter with Torisu at the hospital and asked for suggestions as to concealment, but Torisu could think of no way other than the Hiroshima plan.

About the end of April 1946 Ishiyama called Sato over to the hospital to dis­cuss the experiments, and he, Torisu and Hirako told him that in the event that this matter was brought out into the open they had decided to blame Komori by saying that Komori had asked to use an operating room and had conducted the experiments himself. They were quite worried, said they must get their stories straight, as it would be disastrous for the hospital and University if it be­came known.

Statement of Sato (17 July 1946)

Komori in Kay 1945 told Sato that he thought the American PWs at WAH looked undernourished and sickly, that he would like to take them to KIU Hospital, to which Sato agreed. Sato knows of no order from higher headquarters which ordered these men to be taken to KIU Hospital as subjects for experimental operations; if there were one, it would be secret, seen only by the CG (Yoko­yama) and the Chief of Staff (Inada), then issued directly to the Chief Medi­cal Officer as a secret order (Horiuchi).

After the 1st operation Komori told Sato that he had the permission of Horiuchi to use the PWs in medical experiments, that "the rest of the army doctors did not have enough guts to go along-with him on these experimental operations."

Sato did not order Ishiyama to perform these operations; if there was such an order, it must have been given by Komori. When Kcmori told Sato he had the permission of Yokoyama to use these men for experimental operation, Sato went to Yokoyama, who confirmed it. Sato is positive that Ishiyama and the hospi­tal staff did not request permission to perform these operations.

Sato believes most of the PWs operated on were captured in Kumamoto and Oita kens. They were confined in a small cell at WAH, wore not used to the food they received and were undernourished. Some had light wounds on their bodies, none were seriously hurt, none required hospitalization.

Komori went to the prison, examined the PWs, submitted a list to Sato. Sato told either Komori or Aihara to submit this list to the General Affairs Section and they handled the release of Prisoner, which was done.

SATO (17 July 1946 statement cont’d.)

About 4-5 days before the first operation, accompanied by Komori, the Prisoners were stripped to the waist so Komori could show Sato how undernourished they were, also commented on the injuries of the various PWs. Except for very minor injuries or wounds Komori said that none of them were ill. Sato is sure that in such a short time after that 7-8 PWs did not need major operations.

Statement of Sato (18 July 1946)

About 2000 last night (17 July 1946) Ishiyama called from the next cell to Sato, for the first time since in jail, told Sato tht he did not take the ini­tiative in performing the operations, but was ordered to perform them by Komori that Komori told him that he had the permission of the CG (Yokoyama). Sato advised Ishiyama to turn over this information to the authorities— believes he was waiting for the guard so that he could contact LS.

Torisu then called to Sato, asked if he would be able to get out of prison, then asked Sato who told him about the reopening of the incision and the lung operation, Sato replying that he didn’t know.

On returning to his cell at 1900, Sato called Aihara and told him that he, Sato would take full responsibility for the army!s part, that Ishiyama and his staff had made a sworn statement that they were ordered by the army, that Komori told Sato that he had the permission of Yokoyama, that Sato then went to Yokoyama who said that he had given Komori permission through Horiuchi, warned Aihara that he was deceiving the Allied Forces.

A Col. Takada, CO of the KT units in the Fukuoka area, told Sato in about April or May 1945 that the PWs could be killed, that this was told to him by the CO of the KT when he was in Fukuoka.

This morning, about 0610, 18 July 1946, Sato tried to wake Ishiyama up, but he didn’t answer. At 0700, when the guard opened Ishiyama's door, there was a great deal of commotion, and he knew something happened to Ishiyama.

SATO: ATIS Translation of Statement

While the army commander (Yokoyama) now states that even in China his policy was to treat Prisoners kindly, this is untrue, as he approved Wako's suggestion saying "They may be executed without courts martial." Twice since then he told Sato "It is permissible to execute them."

Until March last year (1946 ?) Col Akita (senior staff officer who supervised others) had said that permission had been granted in early May to execute Pri­soners without a courtsmartial. OKI's investigation brought out the fact that courts martial were unnecessary.

Yokoyama is a man who makes a quick decision; he immediately said, "Go ahead," and when he had something to drink he always said to Sato, "Give it to them - (execution)."

SATO: ATIS Statement Cont’d.

Yokoyama was worried lest he bring dishonor on the Emperor, so he stated that Sato should not say that he ordered it, that he did not order or approve the KIU incident. Sato thought he would take the responsibility himself. However, Sato was a subordinate who could not order or authorize it, and to say he did would be unjust both to the executioners and the executed.

KIU incident:

Sato first heard of this from Komori, but Ishiyama also told him about it after the first - operation. Since it might have unfavorable public reaction if it were known that KIU had requested Prisoners for operations, the request was submitted in the name of Ishiyama. Thinking it would be bad for the army to release the men, Sato went to Yokoyama to verify this permission to Komori. It was decided at that time that they would be released on the responsibility of Sato alone, although Yokoyama knew that he alone would have to be responsible^ when it was exposed.

When Komori came to Sato the day after the first operation, Sato said that they had better reconsider this matter of giving Prisoners to KIU if they were to die, to which Komori stated that he would take the responsibility so it would not cause Sato any more trouble, so Sato said to report the matter to Yokoyama, and he said he would.

20 June incident.

In May or June Yokoyama told Sato it would be alright to execute the Prisoners, again on 20 June at 0100-0200 in the air defense Operations room. It is said that Fukushima was also talking about the execution on the same day. Lt. Col. Hamada CO of the Intelligence Unit, was also in the Air Defense Operations Room, but he was not connected with the incident, so Sato doesn’t think he would be will­ing to talk. After Ito told Sate that the Prisoners were to be executed, Sato did not convey the message to Wako as Yokoyama's order because he already knew of Yokoyama’s plans. Sato merely agreed with him.

After the execution Ito reported to Yokoyama and Ito would have said something if the execution had not conformed to Yokoyama’s ideas.

12 August incident.

On 12 August, after Sato returned from Tokyo and went to Yamae Headquarters, he reported on the conditions as a result of the atomic bomb and the bombing at Kofu and other cities in Kyushu. At that time Yokoyama said, "Because of the report it is all right to give it to (execute) the Prisoners."

15 August incident.

On the 16th or 17th, Deputy Chief of Staff Fukushima gathered the men who executed the Prisoners on the 15th, told them he would take the entire respon­sibility for the executions. 1st Lt. Nakayama should know about this. Fuku­shima now says that he told Sato not to do it, trying to evade responsibility.

SATO: ATIS Translation (Statement) Cont’d.

At the end of the war Fukushima carried two vials of cyanide with, which he had decided to commit suicide in the event this incident was discovered. He told Sato about this.

Other Matters

Sato thinks that 1st Lts. Maida, Akamine and Hashiyama are resentful of the lack of responsibility of superior officers, are still hiding, but Maida told Sato that Akamine and Hashiyama would probably come later.