Statements Concerning Inada

Statement of Masaharu KIKKAWA (1 Nov - 6 Nov 47): KIKKAWA heard that TANI was a good friend of INADA. He also heard the Tokyo report on the 3 executions had been brought to the Legal Investigating Section by INADA.

Statement of Tsutamu MATSUNAGA (5 Aug 45): INADA was responsible for the operation of the WA hospitals. The directors of the hospitals would, go to INADA who would seek advice of HORIUCHI and then advise the director.

Statement of Genzaburo OKI (9 Nov - 13 Nov 47): On 16 Jan OKI prepared a report for the Minister of the 1st Demob, which stated that the report that about 31 flyers were not killed at WAH, but placed on a suicide plane was falsek which INADA and others saw.

INADA told OKI not to report statement of SATO, since it was not true. INADA said that it would not be good if the Occupation Forces found OKI’s notes.

OKI identified a 16 Jan 46 document as a copy of the Demob Min. report, containing seals of I SABA and others. Both INADA and AKITA read the report.

When OKI first arrived at Fukuoka, he suggested to INADA that he be made a prosecuting Officer to the investigation would be easier. INADA said to hurry it, but INADA would not tell him what he knew.

FUKUSHIMA disliked INADA and AKITA who were friends.

Chief of Gen Affairs Bureau: INADA.

Statement of Jukior NAKAO (10 Sept. 47): Fukuoka airraid incident of 19 June: INADA told them they could not do such a foolish thing as kill the prisoners, but to put out the fire.

Statement of Kanji NISHIHARA (14-19 July 1947): NISHIHARA asked OKI and INADA to investigate the matter of SATO, ITO and FUKUSHIMA having something to do with atrocities.

Statement of FUMITOSHI YAMANAKA (18-27 Sent. 46): INADA was mainly responsible for deciding whether a matter should be referred to the CG, making verbal administrative reports to higher headquarters and army units concerned.

Statement of Tokuji ENATSU: INADA and others were required to read monthly reports on flyers and to place their bans on them.

Statement of Kiyoharu TOMOMORI (20 Jan 47 - 20 Mar 47): When TOMOMORI arrived at WA INADA told him that his only duty would be to form the various units of the Civ. Nat. Def. Dorps. INADA was a difficult man to talk with; would not listen to anything in which he was not interested.

On 17 August TOMOMORI reported to INADA, told him that he saw the 7 August execution; that he had learned from Fukushima the previous day that it was illegal. Requested INADA to investigate the execution; INADA told him that he could not help what the

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younger Officers did.

On 8 December TOMOMORI told INADA that FUKUSHIMA questioned him, was not conducting an appropriate investigation, to which INADA said that it was FUKUSHIMA’s respons­ibility.

About 26 December INADA agreed to TOMOMORI's plea to conduct an investigation, asked if he could request the Jap WD or the OF to conduct it. He did not answer. INADA told him it wasn’t any of his business about the Prisoners sent to the hospital.

INADA told TOMOMORI that OKI made a report sent 1 Jan, that if he made a mistake, he, INADA, would correct it.

OKI report: On 3 January. OYAMA went to Tokyo, met with INADA and others. OYAMA asked that the investigation be made quickly. NISHIHARA and INADA then said they would order OKI for the investigation.

INADA stated that if the exams are to be conducted as murder cases FUKUSHIMA and ITO would not be permitted lawfully to be tried because they were considered connected. OKI called on INADA and talked to him, and INADA said that AKITA and he had no connection wit lithe executions.

Conversation with INARA and AKITA about 12 Jan: OKI stated that GOIYAMA reported 7-8 flyers sent to KIU probably killed. INADA then stated that the arrangements had been made with 2A to fabricate a report which would state the flyers had been sent to Hiroshima about July, killed in early August by the atom bomb. AKITA and INADA agreed that every attempt should be made to conceal.

INADA said in the 16A operational summary all US soldiers were to be killed in the US Army came to Kyushu. INADA and AKITA then agreed that they hadn’t heard of executions before the surrender, and INADA stated that he and YOKOYAMA were prepared to take responsibility as CG and C/S.

INADA said decapitation will not be permitted.

INADA told OKI that the fact that archery and karate were practices is beside th§ point. INADA said to make report short and simple, change ,f decapitate” to "execute11. On revising it, he showed it to INADA and others, whsmplaxaiix NISHIHARA placed his seal of approval on it.

INADA went to Tokyo 17 Jan; returned 29 Jan.

Statement of Shigiyoshi SUZUKI (18 Nov 47): The junior Officers were more cooperative than the higher Officers, such as INADA and others.

On SUZUKI's 2nd trip in late March INADA told him he had ordered OKI to tell him all about the case; was sorry he was angry.

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Statement of Hiroji NAKAYAMA (16 Jan 48): NAKAYAMA had contact with INADA and others in the Staff Section in propoganda work. After 19 June ariraid FUKUSHIMA he cane highest ranking Staff Officer and it was no longer necessary to get INADA's stamp.

Report from Central Liaison to SCAP as to Officers who served in Seibu (12 Jan 48); INADA, Masazumi, Lt. G-en: c/s of 16th A & Seibu - 15 Aug. 5o 15 Oct. 45

Chief G-en Affairs Dept of Seibu Demob Control - 1 Dec. 45.

Chief G-en Affairs Dept of Seibu Liaison - 15 June 1946.

Statement of Katsuya YAKUMARU (2 Feb 48): At WA INADA was chief of Investigation Dept. Reports from WA sent through the 2nd Gen A Inves. Commission, and those requiring seals were affixed by IHADA and others.

Statement of Masaharu KIKKAKA (20 Feb 48): AKITA said INADA was handling entire matter of those killed at WAH. KIKKAWA and INADA discussed the Chogku situation; INADA was going to Tokyo to make a true report on the 31 flyers. IHADA said the Americans were going some investigating.

TAKAHASHI said INADA brought report on the 3 executions.

Report from Western Demob of orders to various areas:

23 August 45: INADA and NAKATANI ordered to Tokyo to meeting of Chief Staff Officers (1 night)

21 Sept. INADA ordered to Aichi-Machi, Saga ken and enviorns for inspection of troops - 1 day.

4 Oct. INADA ordered on 3 days' trip to Beppu and environs to inspect units.

Nov. 13 INADA to go to Sasebo for 2 nights to OF

1 Dec. INADA to Sasebo for 2 days of contact OF.

17 Jan. INADA to 1st Demob, for 10 days to attend meeting of Chief of G-en. Affairs.

Statement of Manzo TAKAHASHI (1 Mar 48): INADA submitted a report of 15 Dec. 45 to the vice Min. of War, admitting that the report that 31 airmen has been flown to Tokyo at the end of the war was false.

TSUBOSHIMA sent TAKAHASHI to Fukuoka from 8 to 12 Jan to check on the 31 men, who checked with INADA and OKI. INADA told TAKAHASHI it was useless to see FUKUSHIMA and SATO. INADA said that he and the army commander had nothing to do with the report, but FUKUSHIMA and SATO said they did; that OKI tried to favor the LS, that INADA was therefore watching him, that he would soon submit a report disclosing 31 had been killed. INADA was asked if the CG ordered the executions, and INADA replied that there was no such order out, but that from time to time the CG- has stated that -when enemy lands on the mainland we will have to kill all the prisoners. INADA stated that SATO calimed that FUKUSHIMA had given permission to execute the remain­ing flyers, 15 August.

Statement of Yoshio KOZUKI (27 Apr 48): In Fukuoka Kozuki met INADA and others, and heard unofficially a Prisoner investi­gation was being made. About 2& Jan 46 there was a Tokyo meeting of G-en Affairs Chiefs Of G-en. Affairs Chiefs of the Demob. Bureaus, including KAWAMURA and INADA.

Statement of Fumio TSUBOSHIMA (4 Mar 48): In Dec- 45 INADA told TSUBOSHIMA his assistance might be needed . TSUBOSHIMA thinks report of the 3 executions was signed by IHADA. TAKAHASHI said versions were conflicting, having talked to INADA and others. When INADA came to meeting of Chfs of G-en. Affairs he brought report stating SATO was responsible for 20 June execution. INADA stood by false report; that if discovered WA would take blame.

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Statement of Kaneshiro SHIBAYAMA (22 Apr 48): In June 45 inspected port at Moji on the 16th; thinks he met INADA in Moji. INADA did not mention the flyers. Believes visit prior to Fukuoka airraid.

Statement of Masaharu KIKKAWA (17 Feb 48); On orders of CO KIKKAWA went to WAH about 10 Jan 46, asked for SATO, who was not present, met AKITA, told him there was no suspicion at Hiroshima. AKITA told him to see INADA, who was handling the American investigation, which he did, FUKUSHIMA coming in. INADA said he was worried because the young officers talk to the Jap investigator, that the American Army does not know the facts but will inevitably learn. KIKKAWA then on advice of the CG- went to Tokyo 19 Jan 46 to the 1st Demob saw TAKAHASHI, was shown the 18 January INADA report showing 3 executions of 31.

On 21 and 22 Jan 46 there was a meeting of the chiefs of the G-en Affairs Dept. KIKKAWA did not get there until the fM of the 21st. KIKKAWA sent to a meeting with Kawomura, Yoshizumi, Oyama, Tsuboshima, Onuma, and INADA. INADA said the matter of the 9 Prisoners would be discovered, would like them to arrange that the responsibility would fall on WA. Either Yoshizumi or Hara stated it would be better to remain silent until the Americans made their investigation.

In late Feb 46 Maj. Gen. ONUMA told KIKKAWA that on 18 Jon 46 INADA submitted a report re killing of 31.

Statement of Kanji NISHIHARA (14-19 July 1947): INADA in late Nov 45 told NISHIHARA that SATO, ITO and FUKUSHIMA had something to do with the atrocities, that 31 PWs were killed between June and August. NISHIHARA immediately sent AKITA to Tokyo to send down investigators, OKI arriving at the end of December and NISHIHARA ordered OKI and INADA to investigate atrocities and at end of January NISHIHARA had report set to TOKYO and advised CIC of Fukuoka.

Statement of Ayao OYAMA (21 June 48): In about December 1945 OYAMA met with Yoshizumi, INADA and perhaps Tsuboshima to discuss WAH report. OYAMA believes it was then decided that since the documents were incorrect, it would be well to send someone to investigate.

Statement of Masao YOSHIZUMI (16-23 Mar 48): YOSHIZUMI doesn't recall meeting related by TAKETOMI when INADA was present where stated not necessary to tell truth of Hiroshima falsehood by KOZUKI.

On 19 June 1945 a young officer proposed to FUKUSHIMA to kill the flyers, fearing the would burn, but INADA who stood nearby disapproved it.

Interview with Yoshinao SATO at Sugomo on 20 Sept 48: YOKOYAMA told SATO that INADA bribed FUKUSHIMA not to implicate him. On 9 Aug 45 Tomomori reported to Yamaie Hq and reported as to the manner of the next day!s execution (to INADA?). SATO understands that this report was made to INADA. At the SUZUKI investigation INADA was confronted by TOMOMORI, who told INADA that he ordered it or knew of it, whereupon INADA said not to mention it.

During the airraid (19-20 June 1945) FUKUSHIMA telephoned INADA, said "Let's give them the works." INADA wanted to know who was then taking the flyers out of the stockade; suggested they let them burn.

Statement of Matsuzo SHIMASAKI (26 Sep 48): SHIMASAKA thought either INADA or SATO ordered the flyers be executed, INADA because he controlled the Staff Officers.