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Statement of Inada (18-22 August 1947) 52, RA, Maj. Gen. 1941, Lt. Gen. 30 April 1945 . 9 May 1945 attached to WAH as Chief of Staff of both 16th Area Army and WA. 30 November placed in reserve, 1 December 1945 made Chief of General Affairs Section, Western Demobilization Bureau, apprehended 15 April 1946. As Chief of Staff, directly assisted CG in controlling and supervising the activities of the Headquarters and the units under the headquarters, was in direct charge of tactical problems, supervised the Staff Officers in making tactical plans. Was advisor to the CG in the general handling of PWs, told the CG that the PWs should not be mistreated and that no atrocities should be committed against them. All persons to see the CG on important problems should first see Inada, but since he was busy with tactical problems, Assistant Chief of Staff Fukushima passed on all WAH problems to be taken up with the CG, and Superior Staff Officer Akita passed on all of the tactical problems to be taken up with the CG, who was Lt. Gen. Isamu Yokoyama, while Inada was not there. When Inada was at headquarters, all problems were taken up with him before taken up with CG; if such a person saw the CG first, the CG would inquire and he or the CG would later discuss the problem with Inada. Inada should have known of all the activities and decisions of Yokoyama, was well posted. Inada's office was directly across the hall from the CG's. 29-30 May Inada went to So.Kyushu for about 8 days to inspect defenses with 3-4 staff officers and Headquarters personnel. Between 14-19 June, Inada went to So. Kyushu for about 5 days to witness maneuvers with Maj. Haba and Col. Akita. On 20 and 21 June, Inada went to Moji to meet Vice Minister of War Shibayama and inform him of the air raid damage to Fukuoka with 2 staff Officers. 23 June Inada spent one day inspecting transportation facilities of Moji area alone. 24 June Inada visited WAH to collect his things and move to the 16th Area Army Headquarters at Yamaie. In early July Inada took 2-3 staff Officers of 15th Army to Kagoshima for 3 days, then spent one day each at Goto Island, Tsushima, and Sasebo, gone 7 days. In middle July Inada went to Kumamoto, Amakusa Island for 5 days with several 16th Army members. In late July Inada went to Karatsu and Saga on an inspection trip for 2 days with an adjutant. Between 2-4 August went to Fukuma with Yokoyama and several staff Officers for 3 days. Minister of War Anan visited WAH for one day in late July 1945, inspected, talked to Yokoyama and Inada, went on through So. Kyushu, with, Inada believes, Akita. Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, CG of 2nd Central Army, visited in early June at WAH., inspecting tactical plans for about a day, then flew to So. Kyushu. Faintly recalls that Prince Mikisa visited WAH. Inada saw most of the correspondence going to and from Yokoyama, the procedure set up so that he would see all of it. When Inada was absent, correspondence regarding tactical problems went through Akita and that concerning WAH went through Fukushima. While at WA and 16th Army, Inada worked 7 days a week, sometimes nights. INADA, Masazumi -2- From 9 to 20 May, Inada lived at the Nakajima transient hotel, as well as Akita. He then moved to the WA General Officers Quarters, where all the generals, including Yokoyama, lived. At Yamaie, lived at the Enjukan Hotel, as well as Yokoyama, all the Staff Officers and Section Heads, and some members of the Adjutants Section. At Yamaie, Inada ate lunch with Yokoyama each day. The staff officers and Inada would have a group conference almost every day; Yokoyama seldom attended these meetings. Akita, Haba, Ohashi were most often at the conferences since their work concerned tactical strategy. All of tactical orders and most of orders regarding administration passed through 2nd Central Army that affected WA. Inada would see the secret and top secret documents. PWs were under the juridiction of WAH. Orders regarding PWs came from the Ministry of War to the PWIB and then to the WA CG— doesn’t know whether they passed through 2nd Central Army. The 16th Army had nothing to do with handling of PWs. Inada had nothing to do with PWs; does not believe any orders from the Ministry of War or the PWIB came after Inada arrived at WA; if they had, they would have gone to the CG and Inada should have seen them. The CG would have to approve all important correspondence regarding PWs; all correspondence that the CG would approve would pass through Inada or the acting Chief of Staff in his absence, which would be Fukushima as to the WA phase, and Akita as to the tactical phases. (Inada was absent: 29-30 May for about 8 days 14-19 June, 20-21 June, 23 June, 24 June, 10 days in early July, 5 days in mid July, 2 days in late July, 2-4 August.) Inada believes that correspondence regarding the PWs would go to the PWIB and the Ministry of War. As Chief of Staff Inada was responsible in advising the CG as to whether the War Department regulations regarding the handling of PWs had been carried out in WA. The CG (Yokoyama) wad responsible for the complete handling of PWs, such as feeding, guarding, medical treatment, protection, and seeing that the War Department regulations regarding the treatment of PWs was carried out. However, Inada never did advise the CG as to PWs. When Inada arrived at headquarters, Yakumaru, he believes, explained to Inada the procedure regarding the handling of PWs at WAG. Sato, Inada believes, reported to Inada about the plane crash survivors. Yakumaru explained how PWs were handled in a PW camp, the location of the PW camps, the relationship of the War Department and the PW camps. He also said that plane crash survivors were not treated as PWs until they were acquitted of indiscriminate bombing by a military commission. Inada believes that Yakumaru told him that the PWs were put on work details under the jurisdiction of the CG of any army, who in turn was acting under orders of the minister of war. The PWIB handled the administration. Sato told Inada that until then all the plane crash survivors had been sent to Tokyo after a brief investigation, but that he had received a message from Tokyo that no more PWs would be sent to Tokyo, that it came from the person in charge Inada -3- of plane crash survivors at either General Staff Headquarters or Imperial Staff Headquarters. Before this they had been conducting a brief intelligence interrogation and then sending the survivors to Tokyo. He stated that a stockade had been built within WAH where they were held during their investigation before they were sent to Tokyo. Inada was responsible for supervising the men under him and seeing that the plane crash survivors were treated according to their pending status. According to a directive from the War Department, a plane crash survivor could not be treated as a PW until a Military Commission cleared him of all suspicion of indiscrimi nate bombing. Until the Military Commission makes a decision, they were treated in a regular manner. Maj. Gen. Ito was in charge of the Military Commission at WA. The sentence report from the Military Commission would pass through Inada on the way to Yokoyama. The report would state the sentence and the reason for the sentence. During Inada's time, he saw no sentence reports on plane crash survivors (unless he were absent at the time.) Plane crash survivors on acquittal of a military commission would be sent to PW camps and those receiving sentences were to be sent to prison. The Legal Section (Ito) advised the CG (Yokoyama) regarding the legal affairs of the army and the function of the military commission and the courts martial. Inada sould have been kept informed about the functions of the Legal Section. As Chief of Staff, Inada's responsibility was to advise the CG on all the functions of WA. Inada was told by the CG, however, to direct all of his efforts toward tactical problems, so he was unable to carry out his responsibility in other fields. However, if he failed to carry out the duties assigned to him, he is held responsible for them. The duties of the Medical Department (Horiuchi) were to advise the CG regarding the health and sanitation of the troops and the PWs, including captured survivors. Before the CG would be advised, the problem was discussed with Inada. The Kaikosha Hospital was set up to treat army personnel and their dependents; it was independent of WAH, except as members of Kaikosha. Inada was treasurer of Kaikosha. The Medical Bureau functioned under the Minister of War, advised Imperial Staff Headquarters regarding the health and sanitary conditions of the army. Imperial orders regarding the medical phase would come from the Ministry of War to the CG, lesser matters would go from the Chief of the Medical Bureau (Kombayashi) directly to the Chief of the WA Medical Section (Horiuchi). Inada first learned about Prisoners being sent to KIU in about December 1945. In September or October 1945 had heard that some of the captured air crash survivors held Prisoner at WA had been murdered. Because of this Inada ordered Sato and Fukushima to conduct an investigation. In December Sato showed Inada a chart regarding the number of Prisoners captured and the number of Prisoners sent away. At that time Inada noticed a discrepancy in the figures. Sato told him that some of the PWs were sent to KIU for treatment and had died, explained how the figures on the chart were falsified to cover up. Inada -4- In January 1946, Oki conducted an investigation, reported to Inada at Western Demobilization Office that he also noticed a discrepancy in the figures concerning the fliers and that someone mentioned to him some had been sent to KIU. Inada told Oki he had heard of the matter before, that he thought the Higher Military Court of the War Department would conduct an intensive investigation of WA atrocities. Inada then did not question Sato since he thought the KIU incident was beyond "our control." Inada nevef saw any correspondence regarding the KIU incident. Inada didn’t talk about it since he did not want to get involved. As Chief of Staff, Inada should have known if plane crash survivors were taken to KIU for experimental purposes during May and June since it would not have happened without his being consulted, and he was not; Yokoyama never mentioned this matter to him. Before plane crash survivors could have been taken to KIU for experimental operations, the approval of the CG and the Minister of War would be necessary. Inada then makes these additions to his statement: Also was on a trip in late July 1945 to attend a:Hiroshima meeting regarding tactical plans, was gone for 4 days with Akita. Inada first heard of War Department temporary officials when he first arrived and was briefed by Fukushima, who told him that some of the members of the KIU faculty were temporary officials in cooperation with the National Mobilization Plan. WA Phase - In September or October 1945, Sato or Fukushima told Inada that on the afternoon of 20 June 1945, from 6-8 plane crash survivors were beheaded within the WAH compound. Inada believes that at that time Sato told him that Yokoyama had approved of this execution. Inada then told Sato that if the CG had approved, he, Inada, would have known about it. Sato then said that he might have obtained Yokoyama's approval after the execution was carried out while Inada was away from Headquarters. Sato and Fukushima were then conducting an investigation and it was during this conversation that Inada first learned of the investigation. Inada then ordered Sato and Fukushima to conduct an intensive investigation. Sato and Fukushima had been investigating on their own. Sato told Inada that he ordered the execution of the PCS' on 20 June and that he secured the permission of the CG. Sato was the only one who knew the true facts tho implicated. Inada could hot order Ito to conduct an investigation because he was involved. Sato was in charge of PCS’, told Inada that Ito was involved. Sato or Fukushima stated that on the afternoon of 20 June, 6-8 PCS' were beheaded, that most of the participants in the execution were members of the Legal Section, that the Chief of Legal Section (Ito) was at the scene of the execution. Further, the bodies of the fliers had been buried near the scene of the execution. Either Sato or Fukushima at this later date told Inada that he did not receive a report of this execution because he was away from headquarters. About 2-3 days after that first conversation, Inada questioned Ito and Sato about the 20 June execution. Ito stated that Wako had told him on 20 June 1945 that there would be an execution of plane crash survivors that day, that higher ups had approved the execution. Ito told Inada that he agreed with what Wako said Inada -5- and went to witness the execution. Ito said he had not verified what Wako had said with Yokoyama. Either at that time or a few days later, Ito told Inada that after the 20 June execution he made a report to the CG regarding the execution, that he had not told Inada about the report because Inada was away from the headquarters at that time, that by "higher ups" he thought Wako meant the CG (Yokoyama). On the same day Inada first heard about the execution from Sato or Fukushima, he asked Yokoyama if he had approved the 20 June 1945 execution, and Yokoyama said he could not remember approving such execution, that he could not recall receiving any reports. If the CG had approved, he would have informed Inada. Inada cannot clearly remember if Sato said that he went directly to Yokoyama or that he went to Akita and Akita went to Yokoyama. At first Sato said that the CG (Yokoyama) gave his approval on the day of the execution, later he said it was 2-3 days before, later that it was quite a bit before the execution. Inada told Sato then that Akita was absent from the headquarters on the day of the execution and 2-3 days prior. Later on the same date as this interrogation, Akita said he had never received Yokoyama's approval for any executions. In early December, Sato's chart showed none of the PCS’ killed in its receipt and disposition; it stated that quite a few of them were sent to Tokyo by air, including those killed on 20 June. In late October Akita told Inada the results of his conversation with Sato, that Sato kept repeating that he had asked Akita to get Yokoyama’s permission for the execution, that Sato was lying. Inada believes Sato told him that the bodies were dug up, cremated, and some of the ashes buried and some thrown away. Fukushima or Sato in late September or early October told Inada about the 2nd execution at the same time he was told about the first. This was that approximately 8 PCS’s were executed at Aburayama on 12 August, that Itezono was directed by Sato to carry out this execution, that Tomomori must have approved of it. 2-3 days later Inada asked Sato if the CG (Yokoyama) had given approval; Sato said no, that Itezono: must have gotten Tomomori1s permission. Inada then ordered Sato and Fukushima to conduct an intensive investigation of this execution. In mid October 1945, Inada talked to Lt. Gen. Tadaichi Wakamatsu, vice minister of war, at Tokyo, told that him that several plane crash survivors were killed at WAH on several occasion, that a report would be submitted to him when it was completed; Wakamatsu stated that WAH should conduct a detailed investigation. In early December Sato explained the chart as to the receipt and disposition of PCS'. Inada was still in the army, still Chief of Staff. As Chief of the General Affairs Section of Western Demobilization Office, Inada received the report in December. In late December Tomomori told Inada that Itezono had asked him if he would go to the execution, that he went to see the execution after it had already started, that after the execution he told the participants that they did not execute PWs Inada -6- but war criminals who were guilty of indiscriminate bombing, that he had not given permission for the execution. In late December Itezono told Inada that he was ordered by Sato to carry out the execution of the plane crash survivors, that he thought they were sentenced to death by a military commission and that was why he carried out the executions, that he did not obtain Tomomori's permission, but that he had just told him that he was going to carry out the execution on orders from Sato. In Oki’s report, it appeared that Sato approved the execution, gave the order for it. Inada believes that Itezono told him that Karate was tried on the Pri soners before they were executed. In late September or early October in Futsukaiichi, either Sato or Fukushima told Inada that on the afternoon of 15 August, 8-9 PCS' were executed at Aburayama, that Yokoyama did not approve this execution. Inada believes that he heard something about Fukushima approving this execution. Either Fukushima or Sato stated that the execution was carried out by the young Officers attached to either the Staff or Adjutant Section. 2-3 days later, Sato told Inada that he had discussed the execution with Fukushima and that Fukushima had given him permission. Fukushima had told Inada in a conversation earlier that day that he had not given Sato permission. Inada then told Sato this, who replied that he would not have carried the execution out if Fukushima had not approved. In December 1945 KUsumoto told Inada that because the war had just ended, he went to Sato to ask him what should be done with the PCS1, who then entered a room where Kusumoto thought Fukushima was. Kusumoto said that upon leaving the room Sato told him that the PCS' would be executed and to make arrangements for the execution. Then in late December Fukushima told Inada that Sato had come to him and discussed the execution, but that he did not give him his approval. On the afternoon of 15 August Inada started studying the plan for demobilizing troops. 16 August in Aid, the Chiefs of Staff of the Kagoshima Area armies came to Yamaie to discuss disposal of front line troops, went to Miyakanojo by air that PM. 17 August Inada went to Nagasaki regarding demobilization and to ob serve the effects of the atomic bomb, returning the evening of 18 August to Futsukaiichi. 18 August made preparations for the meetings of CGs under WA and the Chiefs of Staff of the divisions which was held on 19 August-concerned demobilization. 23 August flew to the Tokyo War .Department. Stayed 2-3 nights, attended demobilization meetings, returned to Futsukaiichi about 26 August, worked at Yamaie headquarters on demobilization until 7 September, then went to So.Kyushu for about 10 days on demobilization. Returned to Futsukaiichi about 17 September, remained there until 8-9 October working on demobilization problems* It was during this period that either Sato or Fukushima came to him and told him of the 20 June execution of 6-8 PCS’ and the 2nd and 3rd executions. Inada went to see Yokoyama about this, believes he already knew about them, believes that he said that Sato had already talked to him about the executions. Yokoyama denied any knowledge,approved Inada's request to have Sato and Fukushima conduct the investigation.
Inada -7- Inada notified the vice minister of war in mid October in Tokyo (Wakamatsu) of the atrocities. In December, Sao asked Inada to recognize his chart as official, which Inada refused. It was at this time that Sato told Inada that 5-6 PCS' were sent to KIU. In mid December Inada sent Akita to the first Demobilization Bureau to have him request them to conduct an investigation on WA atrocities, feeling that WA was incapable of handling it. As a result Oki was transferred to Western Demobilization Bureau, replacing Ito, and was to conduct the investigation. At the time Inada learned of the KIU incident, he did not tell Yokoyama since Yokoyama had resigned. Inada did not notify the higher authorities about it because he didn’t want to spread that disgraceful information outside of headquarters. In January 1946 Oki began his investigation, finished one phase by 15 January-- that concerning the responsible persons. Nothing new was discovered. On 18 or 19 January, Inada took Oki’s investigation report to the first Demobilization Office in Tokyo and submitted it to Lt. Gen. Kozuki, told him that Western Demobilization was incapable of handling the case and requested him to have it transferred to the higher military court; Kozuki accepted the report. In early February a similar report as given to Kozuki was submitted to the Fukuoka CIC, this describing only the last 3 executions. The matter of the KIU incident was not submitted by Inada to the 1st Demobilization office nor was it in the Oki report. The CIG report was under the name of Nishihara. Sato was responsible for trying to hide the University incident. |