Statements Concerning Sato

Statement of Akita (21-22 August 1947) Between 18 and 23 May 1945 (is sure of time period) Sato asked Akita to get permission from Yokoyama to execute the flyers held at WAH without a trial by court martial, saying "Captured flyers up to the present time have been sent to Tokyo. Tokyo has reported that they are no longer interested in captured B-29 crew members. Therefore, the dispo­sition of these flyers must be made by WAH. Among these, fliers there are many who have come for the purpose of indiscriminate bombing. If these persons were to be tried by court martial they would naturally be executed. For these numerous fliers who have participated in indiscriminate bombing raids, and who would naturally be found guilty by court martial and executed anyway, I would like to have a policy established by the CO by which these persons could be executed without a trial by court martial."

(After reporting the above to Yokoyama) Akita then went back to his office, informed Sato that Yokoyama approved his request; Sato nodded. Akita believes that Sato told him in his conversation that the LS also wanted the policy established.

In the latter part of October 1945 Inada was investigating the 20 June execu­tion, and Ito, Sato, Inada (and Fukushima ?) were at the Futsukaichi dormitory. Inada called Akita there. Sato said he had obtained permission from Yokoyama through Akita for the 20 June execution. Akita was in south Kyushu at the time, so he told Sato: "It was in May when you came with the request which Yokoyama approved.

Sato only came to Akita this one time regarding the CGfs approval. Akita be­lieves that this October date was the first time he had told Inada about Yoko­yama approving the policy of executing the fliers without trial, when Akita was talking directly to him and Sato.

In late November or early December 1945 Sato showed Akita a chart obtaining a list of the number of Prisoners sent to Tokyo and Hiroshima and the total number captured, by month. Akita on inquiry told that those Prisoners listed as being sent to Hiroshima in July were in reality sent to KIU. (Told by Sato)

Akita heard from Sato or Fukushima that they were going to say that 21 flyers had been sent to Tokyo by plane, but that the plane crashed. Akita heard of this plan in October and the number - 31 - in November.

In February 1946 Sato had requested that he wanted to see Yokoyama and Yokoyama asked Akita to go along, they meeting Sato at Futsukaichi, where they had dinner. Yokoyama told Sato about a masked man who came to his home at night with a gun and asked him to commit suicide. There was no reference made to the atrocities; if there had been, it must have been on the way home.

Statement of Wako (25 Aug - 5 Sept 47) In late June Sato told Wako that it was no linger necessary to send PCS to Tokyo.

Sato requested Wako to let him use some of the space within the detention barracks to confine the PCS; Wako lent him 1-2 rooms on 6-7 occasions when not enough room to put them in their own stockade, which was in front of the de­tention barracks, a separate building used solely as a stockade for PCS, operated by Sato, assisted by Aihara. Wako had no jurisdiction over this

Statement of Wako (25 Aug - 5 Sept 47 Cont’d)....... stockade, and when PCS kept in his barracks, Sato put his own sentries on guard.

In late May or early June a meeting was held in the office of the chief of LS; attending were Ito, Sato, Murata, ’Wako, and another, concerning the punish­ment of the 4 PCS. Ito requested Sato and the person who came with Sato to have the investigation of the 4 flyers as complete as possible so that when they denied indiscriminate bombing there would be ample evidence, to complete it as soon as possible, that as soon as the evidence was complete, it would be possible to try them and sentence them to death. Wako believes that Sato said that it was no longer necessary to send the PCS to Tokyo.

Sato was not responsible for making the investigation, but was staff officer in charge of air intelligence. Ito, as chief prosecutor, could ask anyone to compile information. Wako believes that Sato came to Ito's office 2-3 times.

Several days after the above mentioned meeting, Ito, Sato, Wako, and perhaps Murata had a 2nd meeting. Wako doesn't remember whether Enatsu was there. Wako believes that Ito said that if the PCS were going to be tried, he would ask Sato to head the Commission, that the PCS must be executed as soon as possible.

Several days after the message was received from the War Minister approving the trial, Sato came to the LS to attend a meeting called by Ito. Ito, Sato Wako and perhaps Murata attended— this is the 2nd meeting described above. Ito said that if there were a trial he would, ask Sato to be head of the commission. Wako then said that he did not think it was necessary to try the PCS. Ito and Sato then said that if the air raids increased and conditions became more chaotic, the PCS would be executed without trial.

Wako believes that it was at this time that Sato told Ito that it was no longer necessary to send PCS to Tokyo and they were instructed to take appropriate measures locally. Sato then told Ito that the staff section would have to dispose of their PCS. He didn’t elaborate, but the only thing he could have menat was to execute some of them and send the others to Tokyo. Sato said that he wanted Ito to know that the staff section was going to dispose of the PCS. Wako believes that Ito then told Sato that the staff section should take the action deemed appropriate. Ito meant that he would not interfere with whatever the staff section was going to do.

Ito and Sato decided in favor of Wako's opinion, that the staff section should receive the PCS from the KT.

It was decided at the meeting of Ito, Sato and Wako that the PCS were to be executed without a trial if they thought there was not enough time to carry out a trial. This decision was contrary to the instruction of the War Minister. However, they thought it would be the same as if sentenced to death through proper Military Commission.

20 June 1945, shortly after 1300, a messenger from Sato told Wako that Sato wanted to see him, met him, and he said the general war condition was getting

Statement of Wako (25 Aug - 5 Sept 1947 Cont’d) ......bad, meaning that there had been a heavy air raid and they anticipated more, that the staff section was going to execute their PCS after approval by the CG.

Wako had previously gone to the staff section several times, and believes on one of these occasions, probably several days prior to 20 June, he asked Sato to get Yokoyama's approval to execut the flyers without trial.

Wako then told Ito that he had obtained the CG’s approval to execute the 4 PCS held by LS, without trial; Ito replied, "alright." About 1400, Wako then went to the detention barracks, ordered about 6 guards to dig a pit in the cor­ner of the backyard of WAH, sent one of the members to LS to tell Sato that the preparations for the executions had been started.

About 1500 after they had taken flyers from barracks, a message then came from Sato that he was going to add 4 of his PCS to those executed, and the messenger then went to Sato’s stockade and returned with 4 more flyers. The 8 flyers were taken to the area of the pit accompanied by Murata, Wako, Uemura, several guards, and several Officers from other units. In about 10 minutes Sato arrived. By that time 20 persons were assembled in the area. Present: Sato, Murata, Shimazaki, POs Ohnishi, Saito, Shimomitsu and Soda, (one of the PO’s here named was not there.) Sgt. Maj. Uemura also there.

After the 8th decapitation, Wako announced that that was the end, ordered 3-4 guards from the detention barracks to fill the pit with dirt, and Wako left with Sato, who told him that the staff section would think of an appropriate report to make to the Minister of War, since the CG alone did not have the authority to order the execution of the flyers.

Several days later, Sato sent a messenger to Wako bringing a copy of the false report that was to be sent through the CG to the Minister of War.

On 15 August 1945 either Fukushima of Sato ordered Wako to have the remains of the executed flyers dug up, and he superv:sed the digging up of the 8 bodies behind WAH and 7-8 at Aburayama. They were wrapped in blankets, and Wako believes he turned them over to someone from the staff section for identifi­cation.

On about 17-18 August Sato asked Wako how a report should be written to conceal the death of the executed airman. Wako stated that as' far as LS was concerned, no additional reports would have to be sent. Sato then said that he was going to make a report stating that all of the flyers that were killed at WAH were sent to Tokyo by air.

Between 16-18 August Wako believes that a guard of the detention barracks told him that there was some English writing on the walls of the rooms he lent to Sato Wako examined it, didn’t have it translated, reported it to Ito, Sato, and Fuku­shima, told Sato and Ito that the writing would have to be taken off the walls; they both agreed. They tried to erase the writing by planing the walls, were unsuccessful, and Sato and Ito agreed that the building should be burned down; also Fukushima.

The stockade was also torn down on Wako’s recommendation with the approval of Sato, Ito, and perhaps Fukushima.

Statement of Wako (25 August - 5 September 194-7) Cont’d About 22-23 August, Wako heard from Sato that he and Fukushima had decided to say that all of the flyers had been sent to Tokyo by air and they were going to drop the false story that about 10 had been killed in the bombing attack on Fukuoka.

Sato told Wako that if the General Staff Headquarters would not acknowledge receiving these plane crash survivors from WA, they could say that the plane was lost somewhere.

Statement of Hirao (13 July 194-6) 1st operation about middle of May, 2 Pri­soners. Komori, Ishiyama, Mori, Torisu, Hirao, Hirako, and Tanaka were pre­sent. There were several others present, including Sato.

Statement of Yakumaru (18 August 1947) Sato was in'charge of forming tactical and defense plans for WA, in charge of air intelligence and obtaining air intelligence reports from PCS, responsible for escorting the PCS to Tokyo. 

Yakumaru was assistant to Sato, who was in charge of all PCS. Whenever Sato left WAH on a trip, Yakumaru would be in charge of all PCS. [Marginal Note: no ]

Sato was responsible for obtaining intelligence information from the PCS and escorting them to Tokyo, was responsible for recommending PCS to be tried by a Military Commission to the CG, checked the adjutant section in regard to the welfare of the PCS (Jin), such as medical care, guards, etc., was responsible for making general reports on the general conditions of the Prisoners to Inada and Yokoyama.

Sometime in April 1945 Komori saw Sato at WAH in his office. Akita, with his desk next to Sato, Yakumaru also there, heard Komori ask Sato to release some Prisoners So that he could take them to KIU for experimental operations. (later repudiation in this statement) Sato told Komori that he would see what he could do. Akita later told Yakumaru this. These PCS could be taken to KIU for treatment if ill; however these were not. Yakumaru later learned from Sato that the PWs had been taken to KIU for experimental purposes. Komori told Yakumaru at the operations that they were experimental. Yakumaru doesn’t believe that Sato gave permission for the Prisoners to be taken to KIU since he did not have the authority. [Marginal Note: no ]

Sato was only a staff officer, mainly responsible for acquiring intelligence, from PCS -- not in a position of authority to release PCS to KIU for experimental operations. [Marginal Note: no ]

1300, 20 May, Sato came to Yakumaru and said that there was to be operating on PWS at KIU, that he had arranged for transportation, requested (not ordered) Yakumaru said alright, left immediately. Sato said that "Today’s operations to be performed on the PWs are going to be a new method of operating." Yaku­maru could have refused to go. He went because the operations would be spectacu­lar. [Marginal Note: no ]

Sato and Yakumaru went in a sedan to the Anatomy Section of KIU to the autopsy room. Yakumaru on entering noticed 2 PWs lying on 2 tables (sketch). At this time there Were in the autopsy room; Ishiyama, Komori, Sato, Yakumaru, Senba, Torisu, Mori, Hirao, Hirako and a few others.

Statement of Yakumaru (18 August 1947 Cont’d.) ........Sometime in the middle of June Sato told Yakumaru that there had been 4 series of operations on 4 different occasions. 2 Prisoners were taken the first time to KIU around 15 May, 3 Prisoners taken in the 2nd series around 20 May, 1 Prisoner taken in the 3rd series around 2 June, 2 Prisoners in the 4th series around 10 June. These 8 Prisoners were taken to KIU for experimental operations; Sato told him.

Change -in story: Akita told Yakumaru that Komori came to see Sato very fre­quently, but did not tell him what they talked about (i.e., that Komori dame to see Sato to get Prisoners to be used for experimental operations at KIU)

Wako through orders from Sato released the PWs from the PW camp.

Present at the 20 June execution: Sato, Murata, Wako, Ito, Toji, Onishi, Aihara, and other officers of the LS.

Aihara wrote this (false report stating that PWs had been killed in an air raid) report, ordered by Sato.

Sato received permission verbally from Ito to order this false report, accord­ing to Murata, who was Ito’s aide.

Yakumaru heard from Itezono that Sato had received authority from Tomomori to execute the flyers, having requested permission.

Yakumaru recalls that Sato took a Japanese girl about 17-18 to witness the execution, Sachiko Ishimura.

In the middle of September 1945, Fukushima, Sato, Akita and Yakumaru met at the Keigo School and agreed on a plan to keep the atrocities on WA PWs secret. It was discussed that a false report would be made to the Hiroshima MG, stat­ing that the WA PWs had been sent to Hiroshima, there struck by the atomic bomb and killed, thus covering the illegal execution of 39 PWs. Sato was to instruct the doctors who had participated in the operations on the American PWs. In the early part of September 1945, in the staff room at WAH, Sato stated that if Yakumaru were questioned about the operations on PWs at KIU he was to state that Komori took the PWs on his own initiative and secretly operated on them— he decided to blame Komori because he was dead. Sato said that he would instruct Ishiyama that if questioned he should state that permission had been secured from Yokoyama.

Fukushima told Yhkumaru that if he were questioned by the American Forces regarding the remaining 30 PWs, he was to state that the 30 had been taken to Tokyo by 2 planes, both lost enroute. This plan was agreed to by Sato, Aihara, Oguri, Yukino and Kusumoto. Fukushima instructed Akita at the Keigo School in the latter part of September to tell the American Forces that 8 PWs had been sent to Hiroshima, these being those sent to KIU, that the remain­ing 31 had been sent to Tokyo by plane.

In the early part of November 1945, Torisu came to the Officers Quarters at WA looking for Sato, but he was not there, so came to Yakumaru and told him

Statement of Yakumaru (18 August 1947 Cont’d) ...... that a note had been sent to a newspaper in Fukuoka relating the operations on American PWs, asked Yakumaru what he should do if questioned. Yakumaru advised him to wait for Sato.

Statement of Hirao (28 Aug and ___ September 47) Ishiyama was visited occasionally by Sato, Ishiyama told Hirao that the army had arranged matters so the affair would not be discovered by the Allied Forces.

On about 25 May, after the 3rd series, there was a party held in the evening of those who had taken part. Komori there told Hirao, Torisu, Mori, and perhaps Sato, that the crew members operated on had participated in indiscrimi­nate bombing, that some of them had bombed the Imperial Palace. [Marginal Note: no ]

1st series of operations - when PWs arrived) Komori and Sato were on the truck. During operation Ishiyama stood to the right of the flyer’s chest; Miki handed him instruments. Across was Komori, Hirao to his left, Mori to Hirao's left, Torisu on the left of Ishiyama, Senba, Tashiro and Nogawa near the Prisoner's head, one of them taking his pulse. Sato was a little behind Torisu. Tstusui stood near the instrument table, supervised Miki. Kubo was also in the room. After operation Hirao was hleping assemble surgical instruments and Hirao then left with Torisu, although the dissectors and Komori and perhaps Sato were still there.

In the 1st operation, Senba injected about 200 ccs of the sea water solution from an irrigator. Ishiyama then told Sato what was done, saying that it was very effective. [Marginal Note: no ]

Hirao believes that Hirako came in between the 1st and 2nd operations, before the 2nd flyer was brought in. Hirao recalls, Ishiyama introduced Hirako to Sato at this time.

2nd series - After heart operation - about 1500 - Sato and Yakumaru came into the room.

After the 3rd series - brain operation - At the clinic, Ishiyama told Hirao that Sato had invited the group over to the Officers' Club for supper. Torisu Mori and Hirao then left for the Officers' Club, where they were led to the fartherest Japanese room to the rear of the club where there were Sato and Komori.

After the meal they all left except Komori and Sato. The general topic of conversation was air defense. Operations not discussed because of maids pre­sent.

4th series - Sato came in after the operations were well under way.

About the middle of September Ishiyama asked Hirao to go to the autopsy section to ask again and make certain that there was no evidence left of the operations, if so, to destroy it. He said that according to Sato, when the case was in­vestigated, a scientific examination would be made of the ashes and that the ashes would have to be destroyed.

Statement of Hirao (28 Aug and____ Sept 1947) Cont'd ....... After this Sato came to see Ishiyama several times. Ishiyama said that if no informa­tion leaked out of the University, the incident could be kept secret as far as the army as concerned. Hirao heard that Ishiyama received an anonymous letter in January 1946.

Statement of Senba (2 September and 10 September 1947) 1st Series - 17 May - After prisoners arrived in truck, a staff car then arrived with Sato, Komori and one other officer.

1st operation in 1st series - lung - Ishiyama asked Senba to inject seawater, told him to stop when he put in 150 ccs. The blood pressure was nor­mal. Ishiyama then told Sato and Komori that sea water could be used as a blood substitute. [Marginal Note: no ]

2nd series - stomach resection. Senba believes that Sato and Torisu observed the operation.

gall bladder and liver operation - Tashiro watched the operation. Also Sato and 2 other officers, Yakumaru and Aihara, Senba believes.

3rd series - brain - At 1530 2 guards brought in 1 Prisoner, blindfolded, handcuffed, walking under own power. Sato and 2 other officers were present with the Prisoner.

Statement of Hirako (26 August and 4 September 1947) After first series of operations Hirako was very mad because Ishiyama had not consulted him; went back to his room (from anatomy dissection room) without speaking to him. Hirako didn't hear any more about this operation until Sato and Ishiyama came to Hirako in November 1945. [Marginal Note: no ]

Hirako understood that the Prisoners, instead of being executed at WAH, were sent to KIU, felt that the army intended the Prisoners should not survive the operations, got this feeling during the first operation, Sato affirmed this after the war in November when he and Ishiyama told him that these Prisoners had bombed shrines and other places, were to be executed anyway. [Marginal Note: no ]

In November 1945 Sato and Ishiyama dropped in unexpectedly to see Hirako, Ishiyama introducing him to Sato. They said they were sorry they caused Hirako trouble, that the army would assume responsibility for the operations, they didn’t want the University to be involved, and that Hirako should not say anything to anyone about the operations. They said the Prisoners were on a list to be executed anyway. [Marginal Note: no ]

As far as Hirako knows the authority for these operations came from Sato to Ishiyama.

Statement of Mori (3 September and___ September 1947) 1st series - An army truck pulled up to the rear entrance of the Anatomy Building - truck contained Komori, a staff officer, 4-5 guards, and 2 PWs, who were sitting in the back of the truck, blindfolded, handcuffed. Mori learned the staff offi­cer was Sato.

Statement of Mori (3 Sept and ___ Sept 194-7) Cont 1st series, 1st PW, lung resection - after incision was sutured, Ishiyama said to Sato, "I have now 3-earned how a total lung resection can be done." [Marginal Note: no ]

3rd series - 26 May at 1400 Mori went out in back of Anatomy Building to await the arrival of the Prisoner. A staff car drove up with Sato, Komori, 1 Prisoner, and 2 guards.

After the 3rd day of operations, while Mori was still in the autopsy room, Ishiyama told him "There will be a party tonight at the Ippotei, the military restaurant, after we are finished here." Mori cleaned up, went to the restaurant with Hirao and Torisu about 1730. Sato and Komori were there; Ishiyama came about an hour later. [Marginal Note: no ]

Each was introduced by Ishiyama to Sate, who said, "Thank you for your trouble." Mori left at 2000. Mori thought Sate was representing the military, thanking them for fulfilling their request. It would need the permission of the CG (Yokoyama) to have the Prisoners die by using them for opera­tions. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Torisu (29 Aug - 5 Sept 1947) 1st series - Present: Ishiyama, Mori, Hirao, Senba, Tsutsui, Komori, Sato, and either Miki or Manabe.

2nd PW in 1st series - after prisoner died Torisu then left, noticed that Tanaka and 2-3 other doctors entered the autopsy room. Still present when Torisu left; Ishiyama, Hirao, Komori, Senba, Tsutsui, Hirako, Tanaka, Sato, Sha, either Miki or Manabe, and 2-3 other doctors.

After the operations Ishiyama told Sato that although the Prisoners had died the operations were not very difficult.

The same evening of the 2nd series, Ishiyama asked Torisu to go to the Kaikosha Officers’ Club because Sato and Komori had invited them for an evening meal. Hirao, Mori, Ishiyama and Torisu went to the Kaikosha Mess Hall. During the course of the conversation, Sato told the doctors present, "Many thanks for your troubles," that the PWs were condemned to death by the Commandant of the Army (Yokoyama). Torisu was surprised, decided to take part in no more of such operations. At that time Torisu learned that the staff officer who accompanied Sato to witness the operations was Lt. Col. Yakumaru. [Marginal Note: no ]

On October 1945 Ishiyama asked Torisu to call on Sato, ask him the situation  as to the PWs operated on at KIU, since the Allied Forces were now in Japan. Sato told Torisu there would be no trouble, which Torisu reported. In the latter part of October 1945 Hirao reported to Ishiyama that the Nishi nihon newspaper had published an article regarding the operations performed on PWs at KIU, and Ishiyama asked Torisu to report this to Sato, but he was not there, so Torisu told the story to Yakumaru, who told him that the settlement of the affair is in charge of Sato and he would take care of it. 2 days later Fukushima, whom Torisu had not known, called on Torisu, said that the respon­sibility rest on the army, asked him to keep the matter secret. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Torisu (29 Aug - 5 Sept 1947) Cont’d......... Several days later Sato told Torisu to be silent because of the responsiblity of the army commandant (Yokoyama) . In February 1946 Sato called on Ishiyama, who ,"was not in his office, asked Torisu to tell him that if the Allied Forces dis­covered the operations to state that Komori had operated on the PWs without authorization, and Torisu told Ishiyama, who said "That is no good." Ishiyama stated that he would talk to Sato at WAH.

Statement of Yokoyama (18 August and ___ August 1947) Sato was staff officer in air defense.

There were 31 American flyers held as Prisoners at 7/AH between 1 May 1945 and the end of the war. After the war Sato told him (Yokoyama) that this number had been reported to Yamae Headquarters.

Yokoyama thought the flyers should be tried by court martial according to Military Law, but in September Ypkoyama heard from Sato that they were exe­cuted without trial.

Yokoyama heard from Inada and O^i in January 1946 that Sato said he had his permission and executed the flyers.

In the latter part of February 1946 Sato asked to meet him at the Enju Hotel, Futsukaichi, said that according to American custom the CG of the unit where the atrocities are committed is executed, so that if Yokoyama would commit suicide, it would save a lot of trouble. At this time Sato said he had given the orders for the execution of the flyers, using Yokoyama's name as having given permission. Akit was also present, Yokoyama taking him as a witness. Sato resented Akita being there.

It was impossible for the flyers to be released and executed without a written order, doesn't know whether Sato .had a written order for this execution.

Yokoyama first learned that flyers had been executed at Yokoyama's headquar­ters on 20 June in September 1945 when Sato told him that 8 flyers had been executed then. Sato said he didn’t know who had ordered the execution but that he would investigate.

Sato told Yokoyama in September 1945 that S flyers were executed 12 August, first he heard about it. In February 1946 at the Enju Hotel, when Akita was present, Sato told Yokoyama he had ordered the execution using Yokoyama’s name.

In September 1945 Sato told Ybkoyama that 15 flyers were executed 15 August; he did not say what time; Sato said he would investigate the matter of who ordered it and^let him know. Yokoyama returned 12 October,never had a chance to investigate, resigning on order of the Minister of War.

In Sato’s October report, he told Yokoyama that the flyers had bombed indiscriminately, and therefore illegally, deriving this information from interro­gation.

It was possible other headquarters personnel trusted Sato and believed him when he said he had Yokoyama's permission to execute the flyers without

Statement of Yokoyama (18 Aug and ___ Aug 1947) Cont’d ........... trial, be­cause:

1. He was the senior staff air defense officer having anything to do with captured enemy airmen.

2. The executions happened during time of war emergency.

3. Headquarters personnel were afraid that the heavy bombing of Fukuoka on 19 June was just prior to invasion of Kyushu.

4. Believed the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima 6 August and Nagasaki 8 August were preinvasion bombing.

5. The radio broadcast by the Emperor at noon of 15 August 1945, telling of the end of the war, caused great confusion throughout Japan. A rumor that the Allied Forces had landed on Kyushu added to this.

In January 1946 Oki told Yokoyama that Sato had said he had acted according to the Japanese Army Field Manual on "Operations for the Decisive Battle.", which states that in event of invasion all enemies will be annihilated and that Sato thought this also applied to captured enemy airmen. They had re­ceived these instructions from the Chief of the' General Staff in Tokyo. Yokoyama had ordered that this be carried out in defense operations. Sato may have misunderstood this as applying to captured airmen, but the Manual states it applies only to the invading ground forces.

Akita was with Sato and Yokoyama at the table at the Enju Hotel when Sato told Yokoyama that he had ordered the executions using Yokoyama’s name, thinks he heard it. There were certain things that Sato didn’t want Akita to hear so he talked in a low tone, but Akita might have heard some of this. Yokoyama did not tell Akita bout it.

Statement of Tsutsui (between 27 August and _____ 1947) 1st series of operations - Hirako came in while the operation was going on and it was either during the operation or after the 1st operation that Ishiyama introduced him to Sato.

Tsutsui recalls Ishiyama and Komori telling Sato that the lung showed signs of pleural scars. If pleurisy, and puss forms between the pleura and the lung, it must be opened.

2nd series - Shortly after the prisoners arrived Ishiyama, Komori, and other doctors entered. Miki, Suyama, Mori and possibly Torisu were there, with Sato and another military man. Sato was present at all the operations. Those present at this 2nd series who neither operated nor assisted were :. Nogawa, Tashiro, Tsutsui, Suyama, Miki, Sato and Hirako.

4th series - The operation took place about 1500. Ishiyama, Hirao, Mori, Senba, Komori, Sato, Tsutsui and Miki or Suyama were there. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Aihara-(18 July 1946) In mid May Sato told Aihara that certain PWs were to be sent to the University Medical School to be treated for wounds, handed him a list of Prisoners to be so taken. Such a list was not of the Prisoners’ names; each Prisoner was given a letter with a phonetic sound such as "e", "lo", and "ha", and this letter was put on their record and on their shirts, here on the list. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Aihara (18 July 1946 ) Cont’d ..... Aihara handed this list to 1st Lt. Goiyama, told him that Sato said these PWs were to be sent to the University, that he should wait until someone came after the Prisoners. Evidently Komori had previously talked to Goiyama stating that he, Komori, had Sato's permission to take the Prisoners to the University.

The 1st time 1-2 Prisoners were taken to the University; Sato and Komori also went. Goiyama should know who accompanied the Prisoners.

Sato told Aihara that there was going to be a PW operation at the University and asked him to go. Aihara went by street car; there were 6-7 people there, including Ishiyama and Hirako, Sato and Komori. Yakumaru might have been there. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Fukushima (18 August 1947 and 25 August 1947) Sato, while offi­cially on the 2nd staff, was also 1st staff in charge of air defenses, some others also served on both.

Sato was responsible for captured American airmen because he was in charge of air defense and tactics, was the one interested in getting information from them.

Fukushima believes Sato gave orders to Ohno or Aihara and they relayed them to Yukino and Goiyama.

If Sato had important information, needed something, or had an air tactical plan, he told Akita and either he or Akita went to see Inada, sometimes went together. On the organization chart, Sato was a part of both staffs, but officially was on the 2nd staff and thus always went thru Akita.

In a 2nd raid in August 1944, one American committed suicide in a rice paddy, another died of wounds in a hospital, 14-15 were brought to WAH, interviewed by Sato, who sent them to Tokyo 1-2 days later.

In 1945 flyers were brought into WAH from time to time, interrogated by Sato and sent to Tokyo. After June no more than 3 Prisoners were sent to Tokyo, but kept at the WAH stockade. (Fukushima doesn’t know the reason).

Fukushima was called in by the CIC, borrowed Sato’s notes, then returned home.

A few minutes before the Emperor’s speech on 15 August, Sato said to Fuku­shima, "I want to execute the rest of the Prisoners. What do you think?" (Fukushima had already warned the staff officers that the Emperor would pro­bably surrender.) He said there were 15-16. Fukushima explained the Potsdam Declaration, stating that the Prisoners were to be conducted to a place of safety, that what Sato suggested would be very bad. Sato then said, "There was the incident of August 12th." meaning that the remaining Prisoners would report that execution.

Fukushima said there were other wayry it could be concealed. Sato then left, Fukushima went home, burned papers the next day (none as to Prisoners), and a staff or adjutant section officer told him the rest of the Prisoners were killed, which Sato affirmed; Sato said that about 30 had been killed altogether,

Statement of Fukushima (18 Aug - 25 Aug 1947) Cont'd ...... .Fukushima said, "What are you going to do about it." said "I want to hide all this. Tomomori and Ito might have heard this conversation.

Fukushima later heard 15-16 Prisoners were killed at Aburayama, probably from Sato. Fukushima did not have authority to tell Sato to kill the Priso­ners .

On 16 August or later, Sato proposed a plan of concealment that some of the Prisoners were killed in the Fukuoka air raid, some in the atomic bomb attack that if the figures didn’t agree, that no others were received. A week later Sato had burned his record, did not know how many Prisoners had been received still figuring out a plan.

A month later Fukushima asked Sato if he thought he could hide the executions he said not to worry about it. In September Sato came running to Fukushima said the Americans were investigating in Kumamoto, was worried, unwell.

After the war, they moved out of the cave back to buildings in Fukuoka, set up the Demobilization Office. Sato continued to be worried; the Americans were checking all units. In September or October Fukushima suggested that Sato say that some Prisoners had been lost in a plane crash. A few days later Sato came back with a plan and he and Fukushima worked out the details: that on 16-17 August a Tokyo plane came in, stated that Tokyo Headquarters wanted the Prisoners, that Kusumoto of the Adjutant Section made arrangements to take the Prisoners by truck to the plane. That if this did not work, that a suicide squad of flyers who did not want to surrender came in, fooled WAH officers and took the Prisoners in the confusion. Fukushima was to say that Sato had told Fukushima that officers had come from Tokyo, wanted the Prisoners. Sato said Kusumoto had already agreed to the plan, (whether because he wanted to help or because he was subordinate, Fukushima doesn't know)

They decided that 2 heavy Japanese bombers had come, that 31 Prisoners were sent. Sato figured 31 Prisoners were at WAH after deducting those sent to Tokyo. However, the figures did not seem to be accurate; Sato was careless in his figures. He said 8 were executed 20 June, 8 on 12 August, 15-16 on 15 August. Sato then said that 6-8 were sent to KIU; this was the first that Fukushima heard about this. Sato had mentioned that he would report 9 as having been sent to Hiroshima, this in addition to the 31 and those killed at KIU.

Later Sato told Fukushima that PO Komori had suggested they be sent to the University, that he, Sato, would take responsibility. Fukushima and Sato further decided to say that the pilots had driven the truck to take the Pri­soners to the plane. Fukushima then gave all of the details to Kusumoto, who agreed to help; Fukushima gathered that he didn’t like to be included in the plan.

In October at Futsukaichi (where Fukushima had gone for a meeting as to the employment of discharged soldiers) Inada asked him what had happened to the Prisoners remaining at WAH when the war was over. Fukushima told him that Sato was in charge of them, that part of them had been sent by plane to

Statement of Fukushima (18 Aug - 25 Aug 1947) Cont'd ...... some to Hiroshima.

Fukushima told Kusumoto and Sato of a plan to give the guards involved the fabricated story if questioned, but Sato didn't seem to favor the plan, and Kusumoto said he could not remember all such details, so it wasn't carried out.

At a similar meeting as in October, Inada asked Fukushima if the plan as to the Prisoners was safe, decided that Sato must have told him about the matter. Inada acted as if he didn’t like it. That day or a couple of days later Sato and Inada began arguing in Inada's office (with Fukushima present) about the June executions; Fukushima said he had Yokoyama's permission to kill the Pri­soners. Inada didn’t know how such orders could have gone from the CO down without going through him.

Sato said that Akita knew about it. Inada called in Akita, who said he didn't know about the order because he was not there. Sato said he had come in the staff office and asked to see Inada, that Akita told him that he wash't in, Sato said Akita lied, asked him if he didn't go into Yokoyama's office and ask about the Prisoners, which Akita denied. Fukushima then left.

In mid November 1945 Nishihara (having replaced Yokoyama as CG, WAH), Sato, Fukushima and an unknown lt. were sent to Tokyo to a demobilization meeting for 2 days.

Fukushima and Sato, that night, had a conference with Lt. Gen. Hara, vice minister of war, and Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi, in charge of army administration matters under Hara. Fukushima said it would be better to keep the atrocities secret for better feeling between U.S. and Japan. They replied it would be better to disclose them because the Americans would check closely, that they would feel the War Department wasn't cooperating. Sato later told Fukushima he also felt it was better not to disclose the matter, said he was checking lost planes for his Tokyo alibi.

In late November the CIC asked Sato about plane crash survivors at Yokoyama-mura. Sato said some had been sent to Tokyo, some to Hiroshima. CIC told him to check in Tokyo, which Sato did, the War Ministry telling him no such plane had come in. Sato returned 6 December with 2 leads on planes. Inada was told by Fukushima that Sato was going to Tokyo.

7 December Inada said Sato had been in to see him, that he wanted a true re­port on the Prisoners, told Fukushima to make a report, that he would investigate too.

On the evening of 7 December Fukushima, Kusumoto, and Sato were called to CIC. Fukushima repeated the same "Tokyo Alibi" as Sato told them. The CIC didn't believe Fukushima, gave him 5 days to investigate.

8 December Fukushima went to get Sato's notes on a complete plan on the Prisoners, but he was not too practical, had no summary, Sato had 2 sets of notes,

Statement of Fukushima (18 Aug - 25 Aug 1947) Cont'd...........gave Fukushima one; Fukushima noted that Sato's notes were off 2 Prisoners, he said he did not want those 2 reported. The report showed 2 more Prisoner sent out than received.

Fukushima checked his report with Sato, Yakumaru, Kusumoto and Yukino: Nakamura and Goiyama, but Ohno and Aihara didn't get in until Fukushima had sent his report to CIC.

Sato stated that Yakumaru had been in charge of the Prisoners until March or April, but that he then took over. Yakumaru said that he and Sato had decided that Sato as air defense officer would take charge of the air Prisoners.

12 December Sato took Fukushima's report to the CIC, was told to investigate the case, went to the CIC every once in a while.

In Fukushima's report to the CIC he showed 31 Prisoners had been sent to Tokyo, 9 to Hiroshima, 2 more than they had to account for; Sato said he would do the talking, not to change the figures. One of these reports was sent to Inada, one to the Kurume CIC, one to Fukuoka CIC.

As to the University case, Sato told Fukushima that Komori had come and talked to him about it, that Yakumaru had gone with him to the University once. Yaku­maru told Fukushima that in May 1945 Sato came up to him at lunch, said he would show him something interesting and, curious, he went with him to KIU and saw operations on PWs.

Sato told Fukushima that he had permission to execute the Prisoners on 20 June, that he ordered Wako to carry them out. (From the chart there appeared to be 8 Prisoners executed)

Fukushima asked Sato who gave the orders for the 12 August execution, and he replied, "Maybe it was Tomomori." Several days later Fukushima asked Tomomori on his return, and he remembered that someone had come to his office, said there was to be an execution, denied giving any permission.

Fukushima then asked Sato if he didn't come to him on 15 August and ask permission to execute some Prisoners, and he denied this.

20 December Sato told Fukushima he would take the responsibility for the 20 June execution, said Fukushima should take the responsibility for the 12 and 15 August executions, Fukushima suggested they should tell the whole truth, but Sato wanted to conceal the University case at all cost because of the shame on the country.

Col. Oki of the War Ministry, representing Inada, questioned Fukushima in late December, and Fukushima told him of the executions and plans of conceal­ment, but not the University case. Evenothough he told Inada and Sato he wanted to tell the truth, he knew they were worried, so he didn't mention the University phase.

Statement of Fukushima (18 Aug - 25 Aug 1947) Cont'd , ...... Oki returned in early 1946 to question Fukushima about the 15 August execution, said that Sato had told him that he had asked Fukushima for permission, that he, Fukushima, remained silent, which Fukushima took for approval. Fukushima told him about their conversation, and that Sato had said that he didn't even see Fukushima.

Fukushima first began his effort to conceal the executions 16 August 1945, when Sato brought him his plan and he said he would not interfere, agreed to help him in early October. After the war Sato went to Tokyo in November, brought a report that had been sent to higher headquarters, but Fukushima didn't read it. Fukushima imagines it had been submitted to the PWIB.

Fukushima was at WAH between 20 and 30 June, first denies, then admits a re­port was submitted during that period on PWs by Yakumaru— believes it was a telegram report to Tokyo PWIB, prepared between 25-30 June, stated that 16 WAH personnel died in the 20 June air raid. Fukushima approved the report, knowing it was false, to conceal the execution.

Fukushima didn't know at that time about the KIU incident, not being told by Sato until late September or early October.

Sato told Fukushima that he ordered the 20 June execution, but he got permis­sion from higher authority. Fukushima had no authority to permit the 15 Aug execution, told Sato he. should not do it,

Kusumoto was included with Fukushima and Sato in the plan of concealment because they needed someone to go in between-not likely that a high ranking officer would have gone to*the airfield with the Prisoners, so Kusumoto was chosen to say he had done that.

Statement of Kusumoto ( ) Some time after mid May Goiyama told Kusumoto that Komori, acting on Sato's orders, had injected ether into a flyer and had sent him to the University the day before. [Marginal Note: no ]

2-3 days later Sato came to the adjutant section, said laughingly that a very good medicine appeared to have been made at the Officers Club Hospital. (medicine effective against bed bugs) [Marginal Note: no ]

Oguri reported to Kusumoto in mid May 1945 that he had sent by order of Sato a truck to KIU to take captured' flyers there.

In early September Sato called for Aihara and Kusumoto to appear before him, gave him orders regarding the plan of concealment. At this time Kusumoto heard of the KIU affair, that the jail was destroyed to conceal the executions which had taken place in the jail. Sato told them that 8 flyers had been killed at KIU.

Kusumoto heard Sato tell Aihara that the KIU affair must be kept secret, that he should say if investigation that the 8 flyers killed at KIU had been sent to the 2nd army, that he would contact 2nd army (Hiroshima). As to the rest of the Prisoners he was to say that 2 heavy bombers had come to Mushiroda Airport, Fukuoka, on the evening of 17 Aug from the headquarters of the Tokyo Chief of Staff and picked up the Prisoners.

Statement of Kusumoto (18 Aug - 25 Aug 1947) Cont'd.......... Sato said that Kusumoto should assert that the Prisoners were taken by truck from WAH to Mushiroda airport, that Kusumoto would be responsible for the details., that they should say that these 2 planes were suicide planes that crashed into the ocean. Aihara and Kusumoto told Sato they would not carry out these lies, but he said this plan of concealment had been decided upon by higher officers and was ordering them.

In November 1945 Ito told him that Sato, acting on orders of Yokoyama, had ordered Wako to execute 8 flyers at the jail behind the Legal Section, that Wako then went to the CG, reported that he would now perform the executions, that Yokoyama said, "alright", that he, Ito, had gotten to the scene when the executions were almost over, that on the evening of the execution, 20 June, he had gone to Yokoyama and reported that the executions had been carried out as ordered.

On the way to Sugamo in August 1946, Toji, a finance section captain, told Kusumoto that on 20 June he had executed 2 fliers on order of Sato at the flyers' jail, that Wako had executed some of them, that there were 2-3 others that executed the flyers, that Murata and others were present, that he thought at that time that they had been tried by court martial but learned differently later, that before his arrest Sato told him to hide or be arrested and he answered he was not worried because he had only acted on Sato's orders.

In February or March 1946 Yakumaru told Kusumoto he was being investigated by Oki regarding the 12 July executions, that Tomomori denied he ordered the exe­cutions, that'he and Itezona were brought together and it was determined that Itezona had lied and that Sato had ordered Itezona to state this and that it was further determined that Sato had ordered the executions on 12 July.

On the way to the original Kaminohashi Headquarters to hear the Emperor's speech at noon Yukino said there were 13-14 captured flyers left at jail at Kaminohashi Headquarters, wondered where they would be sent, asked Kusumoto to ask Sato about this. Sato told Kusumoto he would take care of the dispo­sition of captured flyers, but for Kusumoto to wait a moment.

Sato went upstairs to Fukushima's room. Fukushima was in it as Kusumoto went by to the staff room, which was used as an assembly to hear the Emperor. Sato then contacted Kusumoto, sent a messenger for 1st Lt. Hashiyama, the staff section document officer. They then went downstairs to Sato's office. Sato said to give the captured flyers from B-29s to Hashiyama, and Kusumoto left, passed the order to Yukino. Kusumoto then listened to the radio announce­ment, and a speech by Isa, then met Sato, who said to tell Yukino to make coffins for the flyers and give them to Yukino, which Kusumoto passed on, then went to Hirao headquarters.

On the evening of 15 August, Kusumoto heard from Yukino that the flyers had been executed at Aburayama, that the Officers of the Staff Operations Section under Sato were present, that the coffins had been made in the Finance Section room, that he had given them 5 to Hashiyama.

1st Lt. Nakamura brought a box which he said contained the ashes which he had taken from a box of ashes he and Murata had brought back to the LS from Aburayama, that he had been directed by Sato to bury these at Hirao.

Statement of Kusumoto (18 Aug - 25 Aug 194-7) Cont'd...... About 20 August Yukino told Kusumoto that Sato had ordered him to go to Aburayama and collect the bone ashes of the 8 flyers cremated and to take them to a temple behind Hakata Station (Sofukuji), that he knew that Murata had thrown all into the ocean, (Kusumoto doesn't think that he knew that Nakamura had brought some of the ashes to Kusumoto), that when Yukino informed Sato that all of the ashes of the flyers had been thrown in the sea by Murata, Sato told him to go to Aburayama anyway and get ashes amounting to 8 men, that he, Yukino, brought back a box of ashes he found at the crematory, left them at the temple as instructed, and a few days later Sato told him that the ashes should not be left at the temple, that he should go and get them.

This time Yukino brought the box of ashes from the temple to Kusumoto, said that he had been ordered to do so by Sato. Kusumoto said he didn't know how they should be disposed of, ordered him to take them back to the temple, pre­sumes that he did, believes Yukino so informed Sato.

Fukushima went to see Yukino, told Kusumoto he was sick, that Yukino at first refused to comply, but that he said that if so acted all the efforts of Higher Officers would be wasted and requested him to state that on 17 August he had, by order of Sato, turned over all the flyers to Kusumoto.

Statement of Aihara (ATIS translation of 11 April 1947 of Aihara Statement) About mid May 1945, more than 10 Prisoners were interned at the Control Sec­tion. Aihara was told by Sato to bring a roster of Prisoners, as they were to be used in medical operations at KIU. Sato pointed out the names of Pri­soners to be sent to the University and Aihara put a mark by the names, told Aihara to give those names to the control section and take necessary steps to send them to the University. Aihara told this to 1st Lt. Goiyama of the control section and after awhile Aihara saw Sato and Komori leave headquarters in an auto with the Prisoners. Thus 7-8 Prisoners were sent on 4 occasions to the University and Aihara conveyed these orders to the control section as on the first occasion. However, Aihara believes there was one occasion when Komori initiated the preparations, based on Sato's intentions.

Aihara was introduced to Komori by Sato, never discussed "this incident" with him. Not sure that Aihara selected the Prisoners, didn't have the authority. Yakumaru was Aihara's immediate superior. Sato made all the decisions as to what Prisoners were to be sent to KIU. [Marginal Note: no ]

On the 2nd or 3rd occasion Sato cautioned Aihara to keep the matter secret, so cautioned the driver of the car and the guards. Later Sato warned Aihara with the Control Section officers of the secrecy, repeatedly received this instruction from Sato before and after demobilization.

After the surrender Sato said that "we" would report that all the Prisoners sent to the University were sent to Hiroshima, that Aihara was their escort. Aihara tried to refuse 3 times, but Aihara's name went on the record as escort. Kusumoto knows the facts of this. Sato warned Aihara more than 10 times after the surrender. On being investigated in June 1946, he told the fabricated story only to have Sato say that it was false.

Statement of Aihara (ATIS translation of 11 Apr 47) Cont' d. ..... At an army Headquarters, only staff officers have authority to put a plan in action. It did seem that Sato, Komori and the professors in charge at KIU were deep in the plot. Sato and Komori were very intimate friends.

Aihara heard that Sato, Komori and the professors in charge had dined to­gether during the University incident.

Statement of Hirao (14 July 1946) Brain operation (2nd or 3rd series)??) Sato and 2 junior staff officers were there, as well as autopsy students.

Sato came to the University several times, told Ishiyama, Torisu and to keep the operations secret, to convey this to Tanaka, Hirako and Mori . Sato said to act as if innocent. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Ishiyama (by Data on 13 July 1946, not executed) 1st series - lung operation - Ishiyama sewea up the incision, noticing for the first time that Sato and a major were present.

About 10 May Komori brought 3 Prisoners, said the other 2 were to be operated on, to which Ishiyama agreed. Komori stated that he had permission from Yoko­yama and the man in charge of PYfs; Ishiyama asked S&to about this when he entered. [Marginal Note: no ] He said it would be alright to operate since the WA CG had given permission to do so. In November 1945 Ishiyama learned for the first time that these PWs were members of the group that were executed in June or July 1945, from Sato, who said it must be kept quiet, that the PWs brought to the University were not included in the 34 be said were executed. Ishiyama stated that he must report these operations to MacArthur, but Sato dissuaded him, stating the PWs were listed as having been sent to Hiroshima. [Marginal Note: no ]

Ishiyama met Sato twice after the war, the first time about the first of September when Sato expressed his appreciation for Ishiyama's help during the war. [Marginal Note: no ] Ishiyama then changes the date of his 2nd meeting at Dr. Tanamachi's home from November to 12-13 October 1945. Sato said that the army had nothing; to do with the disposal of the body. Ishiyama said it must have been disposed of at the crematory. (Singular ?) The three went to a restaurant. [Marginal Note: no ]

Present at Komori's death were Sato, Yakumaru, Torisu, Tsutsui, and another soldier. [Marginal Note: no ]

Shortly after .the operations, in June, "We were called" to the WA Club by Sato and Komori. [Marginal Note: no ]

Ishiyama was not ordered, but asked to perform the operation. Ishiyama refused Komori's request to operate since he was only a PO, but since Sato was at the operation Ishiyama figured he represented the army. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Ishiyama (by Daty, 17 July 1946, not executed - rough form) 4th series - lung - during the operation Sato, and Ishiyama believes, Aihara remarked that it was the first time they had witnessed a lung operation and they said something to the effect that it was beautiful. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Ishiyama [Marginal Note: not executed] (by Daty, 17 July 194-6 ) Cont'd ..... Ishiyama be­lieves Yakumaru was there, is not sure, believes he and Sato were present at 2 operations, Aihara at one.

At the brain operation,Ishiyama seems to recall that S;mto and Yakumaru were there for the 3rd operation, buthe did not see them after it was over.

At the 3rd operation, Torisu, Hirao, Sato, Aihaia and Tsutsui were present, no other nurse.

Statement of Isa (30 Sept - 2 Oct 47) Fukushima worked in close liaison with Sato on defense of the civilian population.

Sato was the Operational Air Defense Officer; acting on orders of the CG, he would direct air defense. His duties were, to instruct, by orders, the various air units in the WA area, to notify the public of an air raid, and to issue orders (security) and regulations to be followed out during an air raid. In his absence, or when Lt. Col. Yakumaru was for some reason unable to do so, Sato would take over his duties pertaining to POWs.