Statements Concerning Inada

INADA, Lt. Gen.

Statement of Akita (21-22 August 1947) Yokoyama was CG of A, Lt. Gen. Yoshi-naka was Chief of Staff until 5-6 May 1945, then Lt. Gen. Inada until the end of the war.

Akita went in to Yokoyama and told him that Sato requested a policy be es­tablished by the CO by which these persons (Captured Fliers) could be executed without a trial by court martial. This between IS and 23 May 1945.

Akita received approval from Yokoyama. Akita doesn't believe that he told Inada about this.

In the latter part of October 1945 Inada was investigating the 20 June execu­tion, and Ito, Sato, Inada (and Fukushima ?) were at the Futsukaichi dormitory. Inada called Akita there.

Akita believes that this October date was the first time he had told Inada about Yokoyama approving the policy of executing the fliers without trial, when Akita was' talking directly to him and Sato.

Statement of Misao (1-4 August 1947) Misao believes that the Chief of Staff (Inada) and Chief of the Medical Section of WA (Horiuchi) would have had to approve (operations at KIU) as well as the Chief of the Medical Bureau (Kanbayashi).

Statement of Wako (25 'August - 5- September 1947) According to the false report concerning captured fliers, over 10 PCS were killed during the bombing raid at Fukuoka 19 June, This staff section report was copied word for word and a note attached saying the Legal Section 4 fliers were among those described. Wako took the report to Ito, v/ho read it, put his han on it, and Wako then sent the report to the Adjutant Section and from there it went to the Chief of Staff, (Inada) and the CG, then returned to Wako. Wako then sent it to the Minister- of War.

Statement of Yakumaru (18 August 1947) Inada had direct responsibility for all PWs within the jurisdiction of WA. He supervised Sato, who was in charge over the PWs.

Inada or Yokoyama would have the authority to release PCS to KIU for experimental operations. Inada as Chaff of Staff was responsible for all PWs, Yokoyama was the highest ranking and thus the responsible person. [Marginal Note: no ]

Statement of Yokoyama (between 18 and ____ August 1947) At Yamae, It. Gen. Inada was Chief of Staff, Akita a member of the staff.

Yokoyama heard from Inada and Oki in January 1946 that Sato said he had his permission and executed the flyers.

In Yokoyama's absence, Lt. Gen. Isa was in command of WAH at Fukuoka, Lt. Gen. Inada in command of 16th Army at Yamae. During his absence neither had the authority to order the execution of captured enemy fliers; no one could do this with the approval'~bf the War Minister.

Statement of Yokoyama (18 and ____August 1947) Cont'd, ......Chief of Staff, Inada was with Yokoyama at his Yamae headquarters during the time he was there, except when Yokoyama made inspection of the Kyushu coastal defenses. Inada never gave' Yokoyama any reports on captured enemy airmen; if he had known of any executions he would have told Yokoyama.

Statement of Sato (17 July 1946) Sato knows of no order from higher headquar­ters which ordered these men (American PWs) to be taken to KIU Hospital as subjects for experimental operations; if there was one, it would be secret, seen only by the CG (Yokoyama) and the Chief of Staff (Inada), then issued directly to the Chief Medical Officer as a secret order (Horiuchi).

Statement of Fukushima (18-25 August 1947) In 1945, just prior to promotion to Maj. Gen, Fukushima was assistant Chief of Staff to Inada at WAH in Fukuoka. Fukushima received his orders from Inada, had no one under him.

Because of the threatened Kyushu invasion, WAH was being expanded in period April 1942 to March 1945, and Akita a higher ranking officer, took Fukushima’s place, and about 6 weeks later Inada replaced Yoshinaka. In April Fukushima drew up plans for his new job (civilian liaison), took them to Inada.

In October 1945 at Futsukaichi (where Fukushima had gone for a meeting as to the employment of discharged soldiers) Inada asked him what had happened to the Prisoners remaining at WAH when the war was over. Fukushima told him that Sato was in charge of them, that part of them had been sent by plane to Tokyo and some to Hiroshima. [Marginal Note: no ]

At a similar meeting as in October at Futsukaichi, Inada asked Fukushima if the plan as to the Prisoners was safe, decided that Sato must have told him about the matter. Inada acted as if he didn’t like it. That day or a couple of days later Sato and Inada began arguing in Inada1s office (with Fukushima present) about the June executions; Fukushima said he had Yokoyama’s permission to kill the Prisoners. Inada didn’t know how such orders could have gone from the CO down without going through him.

Sato said that Akita knew about it. Inada called in Akita, who said he didn’t know about the order because he was not there. Sato said he had come in the staff office and asked to see Inada, that Akita told him that he wasn’t in. Sato said Akita lied, asked him if he din’t go into Yokoyama’s office and ask him about the Prisoners, which Akita denied. Fukushima then left.

In late November 1945 the CIC asked Sato about plane crash survivors at Yokoyama-mura, Sato said some had been sent to Tokyo, some to Hiroshima. CIC told him to check in Tokyo, which Sato did, the War Ministry telling him no such plane had come in. Sato returned 6 December with 2 leads on planes. Inada was told by Fukushima that Sato was going to Tokyo.

7 December Inada said Sato had been in to see him, that he wanted a true report on the Prisoners, told Fukushima to make a report, that he would investigate too.

In Fukushima’s report to the CIC he showed 31 Prisoners had been sent to Tokyo, 9 to Hiroshima, 2 more than they had to account for. One of these reports was;

Statement of Fukushima (18-24 August 1947 Cont’d)....... sent to Inada, one to the Kurume CIC, one to the Fukuoka CIC.

About 15 December Inada asked Fukushima for a report of his investigation, said that the CIC report was a lie, to tell the truth. Fukushima said the truth should be concealed, whereupon Inada said he would send a true report to the Occupation Forces, but that he wanted to hide the University phase be­cause it was a shame not only for Japan but the world. Fukushima then said he would no longer try to hide anything.

Col. Oki of the War Ministry, representing Inada, questioned Fukushima in late December 1945, and Fukushima told him of the executions and plans of concealment, but not the University phase. Even though he told Inada and Sato he wanted to tell the truth, he knew they were worried, so he didn't mention the University case.

Inada, Akita, and Oki were making the investigation and Fukushima thinks they made a report to the CIC before Suzuki's visit in March 1946, Fukushima having overheard their talking, although they kept this secret from him.

In June 1945, the headquarters was split and part went to Yamae, including Yokoyama, but he was still CG of WAH Yamae. Akita spoke to Inada about the chain of command, who said it would remain as it was, through telephone liaison. Inada and Akita were at Yamae.

Fukushima did lie to Inada concerning the dispposition of the WAH PWs because he thought his plans of concealment good, thought best not to let other people know of them,

Statement of Sato (13 July 1946) Sato knows of no order from higher headquar­ters ordering these pen'-to be taken to KIU Hospital to be used for experimental operations; if there had been one, it would have been secret and just seen by the CG, Chief of Staff, then issued directly to the Chief Medical Officer as a secret order. (Yokoyama, Inada, Horiuchi)

Statement of Honio (25 June 1947) The General Affairs Department was under Masazumi Inada from 1 December 1945 to 15 April 1946.

Statement of Isa (30 Sept - 2 October 1947) Inada, as Chief of Staff, was responsible to direct the activity of the Staff Section and the Adjutant Sec­ tion. He would conduct his duty and serve in an advisory capacity to the CG. [Marginal Note: no ]

Acting on orders of Inada and Yokoyama, Fukushima would conduct the duties pertaining to the air defense directions, mostly as to defense of the civilian population.