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INADA, Mazazumi - (Interned Sugamo) [Marginal Note: 30 Army 46] 420 - 7 Feb. 1947 Domicile: Tottori Prefecture. Born: 1896 1917 - 2nd Lt. 1933 - Military Instructor - Military Staff College 1935 - Member of Military General Staff. 1939 - Dismissed from Military Staff position of GHQ,. 1940 - Dismissed from member of Military Munitions discussion Commission. 30 April 1946 ~ Demobilization Secretary. (BUT - 1938 • Colonel 1941 - Major General 1945 - Lt. General) |
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420 - 2 December. On 2 December 1946 a raid was conducted at the Ogori House of Inada in which all his papers were siezed and are now being translated. |
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420 - 19 August Inada, the C/S of Western Hqs and 16th Army. |
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420 - 10 Sept. |
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Statement of Sato. Inada knew all about the atrocities. By implication (all Staff Officers) Inada was present at the August hotel meeting held concerning the secrecy of the atrocities. He was specifically stated to have been present at the November meeting concerning the same subject. |
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Statement of Yamanaka Inada was C/S of the 16th and Western Armies. He would have to give approval of release of prisoners of KIU for experimental operations. |
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Statement of Sato - 420 - 25 Feb. 1947 Inada, Yokoyama and Sato would be notified when fliers were picked up in jurisdiction of Western Army, Inada was C/S March 1945 until surrender. On 25 June, Inada, Yokoyama went to Ygare^rl when the Western Army Hqs were separated from the 16th Army. Komori was advised to get an opinion from Yokoyama, Horiuchi and Inada before taking prisoners for KIU experiments. At the 17 August 1945 meeting called by Yokoyama, Inada answered Yakamaru's question by saying that they must be very careful to hide the troth about the executed prisoners. Inada warned Fukushima that the Americans regarded prisoners as heroes and that they must endeavor to have a fool proof plan. After the war, upon the return of Sato from Tokyo (Nov.(?)) Inada called a meeting of Fukushima, Akida, Yakamaru and Sato, at which time Inada said it was better to conceal atrocities. They decided to conceal the operations. Inada stated that he did not think Yokoyama knew of the operations. Then Sato states that he did not like Inada and that he lied when he said that Sato told Inada about the KIU incident, but that Yokoyama told him to tell Inada, but that he did not although Yokoyama might possibly have told him. Later Inada asked Sato whether KIU had requested prisoners. Sato replied that it had and Inada insisted that Sato should take the responsibility. In December Inada, Akita and Sato met. Inada said the Western Army could not have a trial since the Chief of the Legal Section of Western Array was implicated and that, therefore, Tokyo should have it (evidently a trial to wash their own linen so that it would not be done by the occupation). Wako had previously requested Sato to get the approval of Inada in Yokohama to execute the prisoners without trial before the atrocities occurred. |
This book documents the legal proceedings of the December 1949 Khabarovsk trial in which twelve members of the Japanese Army's covert biological warfare Unit 731 were prosecuted for their war crimes. The trial sought to hold key leaders in Japan's bio-weapons program accountable for atrocities after WWII.