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FUKUSHIMA, KYUSAKU Statement of Fukushima (18-25 August 1947) 50, RA, made Maj. Gen. in 1945, was a V/A staff officer most of the time from 1942 to 1945. In 1945, just prior to promotion to major general, he was assistant chief of staff to Inada at WAH in Fukuoka, his duties relating to liaison between the army and the civilians and civil government of Kyushu. As such he was liaison between the army and prefectural governments, handled procurement through an important internal affairs civilian, Tzuka, supervised civilian defense, was PRO. In April or May, when Fukushima was a major general, Col. Tomomori took over some of his duties. Fukushima remained with WA until sometime in August 1945. From December to March 1946 he worked for 1st Demobilization Office in Fukuoka (was in army from August to December 1945) Chain of command at WAH from April to August: Lt. Gen. Yokoyama was the CG, Lt. Gen, Inada was Chief of Staff. Fukushima received his orders from Inada, had no one under him. Fukushima normally went thru Akita, senior staff officer of the 1st Staff Section, but could go to the Chief of Staff without going thru Akita, sometimes did. The 1st Staff was directly concerned with the military, the 2nd with civilian activities. Sato, while officially on the 2nd staff, was also' 1st staff in charge of air defenses. Some others also served on both. Fukushima was on neither. If papers pertained to the 1st staff, Akita forwarded them; otherwise he directed them to the proper 2nd staff section officer. Jin was in the Adjutant’s Section, Lt, Col. Yakumaru in the 2nd staff section, Col. Shinozuka worked in civilian liaison, coordinated with Fukushima on educational matters, such as fire and air raid precautions, but not as to research. Orders regarding experiments and research would come from the Ministry of Edu cation to the War Ministry to the Staff Section concerned to the field units, would come thru Akita at WA. Duties of WA Officers Sato was responsible for captured American airmen because he was in charge of air defense and tactics, was the one interested in getting information from them. 1st Lt. Ohno was in charge of the Prisoners under Sato; his place was later taken by Aihara. Yakumaru had charge of PVT records of Prisoners brought outside of Japan and possibly Ohno and Ihara also took orders from him. The clothing, sleeping quarters, and rations were handled by the Adjutants Section. Lt. Goiyama was in charge of this; Capt. Yukino had something to do with this phase of handling Prisoners. Fukushima believes that Yukino and Goiyama were just responsible for care and feeding of the Prisoners and took any other orders from the Staff Section. Fukushima believes Sato gave orders to Ohno or Aihara and they relayed them to Yukino and Goiyama. Chain of Command— WAH If Sato had important information, needed something, or had an air tactical plan he told Akita and either he or Akita went to see Inada, sometimes went together. On the organization chart, Sato was a part of both staffs, but officially was on the 2nd staff and thus always went through Akita. 1942 - March 1945 From April 1942 to March 1945, Fukushima was senior staff officer at WAH, directly under Chief of Staff Yoshinaka. Because of the threatened Kyushu invasion, WAH was being expanded, and Akita, a higher ranking officer, took Fukushima1s place, and about 6 weeks later Inada replaced Yoshinaka. In April 1945 Fukushima drew up plans for his new job (civilian liaison), took them to Inada. Shortly after, Tomornori came in. 12 June their duties officially began. As senior staff officer, Fukushima coordinated matters for the Chief of Staff, handled administration details, 1st position about 3 years. Receipt of Prisoners. WAH In June 1944 there were 3 air raids on the Yawata steel mills in Kokura. No Prisoners were taken. In a 2nd raid in August 1944, 1 American committed suicide in a rice paddy, another died of wounds in a hospital, 14-15 were brought to WAH, interviewed by Sato, who sent them to Tokyo 1-2 days later. In December there was a light air raid on the steel mills, and a raid on Omura Naval Air Base, but Fukushima knows of no flyers taken. In 1945 flyers were brought into WAH from time to time, interrogated by Sato and sent to Tokyo. After June no more than 3 Prisoners were sent to Tokyo, but kept at the WAH stockade. (Fukushima doesn’t know the reason). Execution of Prisoners Fukushima was called in by the CIC, borrowed Sato’s notes, then returned them. As he recalls there were between 70-80 Prisoners brought in, about half sent to Tokyo, half (38-40) executed, 3 sent to Tokyo in June. On 24-25 June Ito told Fukushima that several Prisoners had been executed a few days before. Ito was judge advocate of the Kurume Division, was in Fukuoka getting ready to go to Kurume when the division was to move to Yamae, passed through Fukushima’s office, said, ”1 heard that some B-29 flyers were executed the other day.” Fukushima was busy, said, ”Is that so.?” The atomic bomb was then dropped and they moved to a dugout known as Hirao Headquarters near WAH. 13 August, Tomornori said, ”1 saw the executions last night and the Americans were very brave,” said they were executed near the crematory. A few minutes before 'the Emperor’s speech on 15 August, Sato said to Fukushima, ”1 want to execute the rest of the Prisoners. What do you think?” (Fukushima had already warned the staff officers that the Emperor would probably surrender.) He said there were 15-16. Fukushima explained the Potsdam Declaration, stating that the Prisoners were to conducted to a place of safety, that what Sato suggested would be very bad. Sato then said, ’’There was the incident of August 12th.” meaning that the remaining Prisoners would report that execution. Fukushima said there were other ways it could be concealed. Sato then left, Fukushima went home, burned papers the next day (none as to Prisoners), and a staff or adjutant section officer told him the rest of the Prisoners were killed, which Sato affirmed; Sato said that about 30 had been killed altogether, Fukushima said "What are you going to do about it?” said "I want to bide all this, Tomomori and Ito might have heard this conversation. Fukushima later heard 15-16 Prisoners were killed at Aburayama, probably from Sato. Fukushima did not have authority to tell Sato to kill the Prisoners. 16-or-17 August 1945: 1st Plan of Concealment; Sato-- Fukushima. On 16 August or later, Sato proposed a plan of concealment that some of the Prisoners were killed in the Fukuoka air raid, some in the atomic bomb attack, that if the figures didn’t agree, that no others were received. A week later Sato had burned his record, did not know how many Prisoners had been received, still figuring out a plan. September 1945: Further Concealment Plans: Sato - Fukushima A month later Fukushima asked Sato if he thought he could hide the executions; he said not to worry about it. In September Sato came running to Fukushima, said the Americans were investigating in Kumamoto, was worried, unwell. After the war, they moved out of the cave back to buildings in Fukuoka, set up the Demobilization office. Sato continued to be worried; the Americans were checking all units. In September or October Fukushima suggested that Sato say that some Prisoners had been lost in a plane crash. A few days later Sato came back with a plan and he and Fukushima worked out the details; that on 16-17 August a Tokyo plane came in, stated that Tokyo headquarters wanted the Prisoners, that Kusumoto of the Adjutant Section made arrangements to take the Prisoners by truck to the plane. That if this did not work, that a suicide squad of flyers who did not want to surrender came in, fooled WAH Officers and took the Prisoners in the confusion. Fukushima was to say that Sato had told Fukushima that Officers had come from Tokyo, wanted the Prisoners. Sato said Kusumoto had already agreed to the plan, (whether because he wanted to help or because he was subordinate, Fukushima doesn’t know) They decided that 2 heavy Japanese bombers had come, that 31 Prisoners were sent. Sato figured 31 Prisoners were at WAH after deducting those sent to Tokyo. However, the figures did not seem to be accurate; Sato was careless in his figures. He said S were executed 20 June, 8' on 12 August, 15 or 16 on 15 August. Sato then said that 6-8 were sent to KIU; this was the first that Fukushima heard about this. Sato had mentioned that he would report 9 as having been sent to Hiroshima, this in addition to the 31 and those killed at KIU. Later Sato told Fukushima that P0 Komori had suggested they be sent to the University, that he, Sato, would take responsibility. Fukushima and Sato further decided to say that the pilots had driven the truck to take the Prisoners to the plane. Fukushima then gave all of the details to Kusumoto, who agreed to help; Fukushima gathered that he didn’t like to be included in the plan. October 1945 - at Futsukaichi - Inada, Fukushima In October at Futsukaichi (where Fukushima had gone for a meeting as to the employment of discharged soldiers) Inada asked him what had happened to the Prisoners remaining at WAH when the war was over. Fukushima told him that Sato was in charge of them, that part of them had been sent by piano to Tokyo and some to Hiroshima. Fukushima told Kusumoto and Sato of a plan to give the guards involved the fabricated story if questioned, but Sato didn't seem to'favor the plan, and Kusumoto said he could not remember all such details, so it wasn’t carried out. November 1945 - at Futsukaichi - Inada, Sato, Akita, Fukushima At a similar meeting as in October, Inada asked Fukushima if the plan as to the Prisoners was safe, decided that Sato must have told him about the matter. Inada acted as if he didn’t like it. That day or a couple of days later Sato and Inada began arguing in Inada’s office (with Fukushima present) about the June executions; Fukushima said he had Yokoyama's permission to kill the Prisoners. Inada didn’t know how such orders could have gone from the CG down without going through him. Sato said that Akita knew about it. Inada called in Akita, who said he didn’t know about the order because he was not there. Sato said he had come in the staff office and asked to see Inada, that Akita told him that he wasn’t in. Sato said Akita lied, asked him if he didn’t go into Yokoyama's office and ask about the Prisoners, which Akita denied. Fukushima then left. November 1945 - Meeting at War Ministry: Sato, Nishihara, Fukushima. In mid November 1945 Nishihara (having replaced Yokoyama as CG, WAH), Sato, Fukushima and an unknown Lt. were sent to" Tokyo to a demobilization meeting for 2 days. War Minister Shimomura called all the CGs together, told them they should forward reports to the War Minister of any atrocities in their command. This, Nishihara told Fukushima. Fukushima and Sato that night had a conference with Lt. Gen. Hara, vice minister of war, and Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi, in charge of army administration matters under Hara. Fukushima said it would be better to keep the atrocities secret for better feeling between U.S. and Japan. They replied it would be better to disclose them because the Americans would check closely, that they would feel the War Department wasn’t cooperating. Sato later told Fukushima he also felt it was better not to disclose the matter, said he was checking lost planes for his Tokyo alibi. November 1945 - At Fukuoka - Further Plans: Sato, Kusumoto, Fukushima. Back in Fukuoka about 20 November, Inada thought that all atrocities should be reported; Ito did not give Fukushima a definite answer. Kusumoto said it was alright with him if they stuck to the plan, did not appear to be enthusiastic. November 1945 - 1st Interrogations by Kurume CIC In late November the CIC asked Sato about plane crash survivors at Yokoyamamura, Sato said some had been sent to Tokyo, some to Hiroshima. CIC told him to check in Tokyo, which Sato did, the War Ministry telling him no such plane had come in. Sato returned 6 December with 2 leads on planes. Inada was told by Fukushima that Sato was going to Tokyo. 7 December 1945 - Inada Requested a true Report. 7 December Inada said Sato had been in to see him, that he wanted a true report on the Prisoners told Fukushima to make a report, that he would investigate too. 7 December 19A5 - CIC interrogated Fukushima and ordered him to make investigation. On the evening of 7 December, Fukushima, Kusumoto and Sato were called to CIC. Fukushima repeated the same "Tokyo" alibi as Sato told them. The CIC didn’t believe Fukushima, gave him 5 days to investigate. 8-12 December 1945 - Substance of Fukushima's Investigation and Report. 8 December Fukushima went to get Sato’s notes on a complete plan on the Prisoners, but he was not too practical, had no summary. Sato had 2 sets of notes, gave Fukushima one; Fukushima noted that Sato’s notes were of 2 Prisoners, he said he did not want those 2 reported. The report showed 2 more Prisoners sent out than received. Fukushima checked his report with Sato, Yakumaru, Kusumoto and Yukino; Nakamura and Goiyama, but Ohno and Aihara didn’t get in until Fukushima had sent his report to CIC. Sato stated that Yakumaru had been in charge of the Prisoners until March or April, but that he then took over. Yakumaru said that he and Sato had decided that Sato as air defense officer would take charge of the air Prisoners. On the 5th day, Fukushima reported to Kurume CIC he hadn’t contacted 2 people (Aihara and Ohno) yet. 12 December Sato took Fukushima’s report to the CIC, was told to investigate the case, went to the CIC every once in a while. In Fukushima’s report to the CIC he showed 31 Prisoners had been sent to Tokyo, 9 to Hiroshima, 2 more than they had to account for; Sato said he would do the talking, not to change the figures. One of these reports was sent to Inada, one to the Kurume CIC, one to the Kurume CIC, one to the Fukuoka CIC. Fukushima’s statement on true facts revealed by investigation. As to the University case, Sato told Fukushima that Komori had come and talked to him about it, that Yakumaru had gone with him to the University once. Yakumaru told Fukushima that in May 1945 Sato came up to him at lunch, said he would show him something interesting and, curious, he went with him to KIU and saw operations on PWs. Sato told Fukushima that he had permission to execute the Prisoners on 20 June, that he ordered Wako to carry them out. (From the chart there appeared to be 8 Prisoners executed) Fukushima asked Sato who gave the orders for the 12 August execution, and he replied, ’’Maybe it was Tomornori.” Several days later Fukushima asked Tomomori on his return, and he remembered that someone had come to his office, said there was to be an execution, denied giving any permission. Fukushima then asked Sato if he didn’t come to him on 15 August and ask permission to execute some Prisoners, and he denied this. 15 December 1945 - Inada. Fukushima. About 15 December Inada asked Fukushima for a report of his investigation, said that the CIC report was a lie, to tell the truth. Fukushima said the truth should be concealed, whereupon Inada said he would send a true report to the Occupation Forces, but that he wanted to hide the University phase because it was a shame not only for Japan but the world. Fukushima then said he would no longer try to hide anything. 20 December 1945 - Sato. Fukushima. 20 December Sate told Fukushima. he would take the responsibility for the 20 June execution, said Fukushima should take the responsibility for the 12 and 15 August executions. Fukushima suggested they should tell the whole truth, but Sato wanted to conceal the University case at all cost because of the shame on the country. About 30 December 1945: Oki, Fukushima. Col. Oki of the War Ministry, representing Inada, questioned Fukushima in late December, and Fukushima told him of the executions and plans of concealment, but not the University case . Even though he told Inada and Sato he wanted to tell the truth, he knew they were worried, so he didn’t mention the University phase. Early January 1946 - Oki, Fukushima Oki returned in early 1946 to question Fukushima about the 15 August execution, said that Sato had told him that he had asked Fukushima for permission, that he, Fukushima, remained silent, which Fukushima took for approval. Fukushima told him about their conversation, and that Sato had said that he didn’t even see Fukushima. Late January 1946 - Suzuki, Fukushima. In late January, former Lt. Gen. Suzuki of the Tokyo JA Section questioned Fukushima as Oki had done, Fukushima giving him the same story, this time written, saying nothing of the KIU phase. Fukushima doesn’t know whether he talked to any of the others. March 1946 - Suzuki, Fukushima Suzuki returned in March, asked Fukushima if he hadn’t said ”yes" to Sato’s request to execute Prisoners 15 August. Fukushima denied this, signed a written statement. Possible Report to CIC by Inada, Akita and Oki. Inada, Akita, and Oki were making the investigation and Fukushima thinks they made a report to the CIC before Suzuki’s visit in March 1946, Fukushima having overheard their talking, although they kept this secret from him. 15 April 1946 - Fukushima interrogated by Fukuoka CIC. 15 April Fukuoka CIC questioned Fukushima as to who ordered the executions, but didn’t ask about the University phase. Fukushima was interned in Dotemachi Prison. Conclusion. In June 1945, the headquarters was split and part went to Yamae, including Yokoyama, but he was still CG of WAH and Yamae. Akita spoke to Inada about the chain of command, who said it would remain as it was, through telephone liaison. Inada and Akita were at Yamae. There was no Officer specifically in charge of all activities at WAH. Fukushima stayed in Fukuoka; they were semi-independent with no one put in charge, although Lt. Gen. Isa was the highest ranking officer, remaining in Fukuoka, Lt. Gen. Nara next highest, Maj, Gen. Ito 3rd, Fukushima 4th. When Fukushima was making his investigation, asked for people to tell him of atrocities. Maj. Enatsu (here spelled ’’Inatsu”) told Fukushima that he and Tomornori had attended the 12 August execution, that bows and arrows were used, but no one killed by that manner. Fukushima first began his effort to conceal the executions 16 August 1945, when Sato brought him his plan and he said he would not interfere, agreed to help him in early October. After the war Sato went to Tokyo in November, brought a report that had been sent to higher headquarters, but Fukushima didn't read it. Fukushima imagines it had been submitted to the PWIB. Fukushima was at WAH between 20 and 30 June, first denies, then admits a report was submitted during that period on PWs by Yakumaru— believes it was a telegram report to Tokyo PWIB, prepared between 24-30 June, stated that 16 WAH personnel died in the 20 June air raid. Fukushima approved the report, knowing it was false, to conceal the execution. If Fukushima had disclosed the executions it would have meant a lot of red tape and reports. Fukushima thought that 8 were decapitated 20 June, thought it strange 16 reported. Fukushima thought the staff officers might be trying to confuse the records. At that time there was no senior staff officer at WAH, but here Fukushima took the responsibility since urgent, did not have the authority to sign it, did not check with Yamae or superiors, but it was not in Fukushima's mind to conceal the executions. Fukushima didn’t know at that time about the KIU incident, not being told by Sato until late September or early October. Fukushima did lie to Inada concerning the disposition of WAH PWs because he thought his plans of concealment good, thought best not to let other people know of them. Fukushima assumed voluntarily the responsibility for concealment of the PW executions in the alibi that the Prisoners were sent to Tokyo. Fukushima was not interested in helping his superior officers or Sato, but Japan only. If it weren’t for the plan of concealment Fukushima would not be connected with the atrocities. Sato told Fukushima that he ordered the 20 June execution, but he got permission from higher authority. Fukushima had no authority to permit the 15 August execution, told Sato he should not do it. As liaison officer with the civilians, Fukushima contacted Okuno, a KIU chemist, just before the surrender— the only time. Kusumoto was included with Fukushima and Sato in the plan of concealment because they needed someone to go in between— not likely that a high ranking officer would have gone to the airfield with the Prisoners, so Kusumoto was chosen to say he had'done that. When Fukushima decided to wash his hands of the matter, he felt that if Inada told the truth he would probably have to, but if he didn’t say anything, he would say nothing. |